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CONFRONTATION IN THE AGE OF PLEA BARGAINING 
William Ortman* 
A defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him is a 
cornerstone of our adversarial system of criminal justice. Or is it? Under 
current law, defendants can invoke their confrontation right only by 
going to trial. But trials account for about five percent of criminal 
convictions. That means that the overwhelming majority of defendants 
convicted in the United States never get to exercise their constitutional 
right to confront the government’s witnesses. 
This Essay argues that the Supreme Court should align its 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence with the reality of contemporary 
criminal justice. The Sixth Amendment grants a criminal defendant the 
right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The problem is 
that the Court reads this text as if it said “the witnesses against him at 
trial.” Nothing compels the Court’s trial-centric gloss on what it means 
to be a witness. To the contrary, the Confrontation Clause’s text and 
purposes point towards recognizing that those whose “testimony” the 
government relies on in plea bargaining are “witnesses” too. This Essay 
therefore proposes a procedural device through which defendants could 
exercise their right to confront (i.e., cross-examine) that class of 
witnesses—the “Sixth Amendment deposition.” By conducting Sixth 
Amendment depositions, defendants would learn the strengths and 
weaknesses of the government’s evidence, enabling them to negotiate 
fairer and more reliable plea bargains. Sixth Amendment depositions 
would deliver to our “system of pleas” what confrontation at trial brought 
to an earlier version of American criminal justice—adjudication 
enhanced by adversarial testing of the government’s case. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court grandly declared that 
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment “commands” that the 
government’s case against a criminal defendant be tested in the “crucible 
of cross-examination.”1 To enforce that edict, the Court held that pros-
ecutors may not use uncrossed “testimonial hearsay” in criminal trials.2 
This holding is widely viewed as seismic. Crawford “revolutionized this area 
of the law,” a leading scholar noted recently.3 As another put it, “Crawford 
is among the most important constitutional cases in modern times.”4 
This Essay argues that the conventional understanding of Crawford as 
“revolutionary” misses the forest for the trees. Crawford might have trans-
formed Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, but it left the confrontation 
                                                                                                                           
 1. 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
 2. Id. at 61–62. 
 3. Michael S. Pardo, Confrontation After Scalia and Kennedy, 70 Ala. L. Rev. 757, 763 
(2019) (“Crawford revolutionized this area of law by effectively severing the ties between the 
Confrontation Clause’s requirements and modern hearsay law.”); see also Andrew C. Fine, 
Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Clause After Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. 
Indiana, 105 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 11, 11 (2006) (“[I]n Crawford v. Washington, the 
Supreme Court had worked a revolutionary transformation of Confrontation Clause 
analysis . . . .”); Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Law and the Law of Evidence, 101 
Cornell L. Rev. 57, 69 (2015) (“The Supreme Court’s recent Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence over the past few decades has been nothing short of a revolution.”). 
 4. Gary Lawson, Confronting Crawford: Justice Scalia, the Judicial Method, and the 
Adjudicative Limits of Originalism, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2265, 2266 (2017). 
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right itself mostly dormant. That’s because the confrontation right the 
Court articulated in Crawford is one that defendants can claim only at trial, 
and our criminal legal system has remarkably few of those. Criminal 
convictions today come overwhelmingly from guilty pleas, not guilty 
verdicts.5 In a system of pleas,6 a confrontation right that attaches at trial 
cannot make good on Crawford’s pledge to restore the “crucible of cross-
examination.”7 
Judicial and scholarly interest in confrontation has been immense 
since Crawford.8 Yet it has slipped under the radar that plea bargaining 
renders Crawford and the Confrontation Clause empty promises.9 It doesn’t  
have to be this way. Plea bargaining and a robust confrontation right could 
coexist. But for the Confrontation Clause to be more than a parchment 
barrier, the Supreme Court would have to update its doctrine to account 
for the world as it is—a world in which plea bargaining is ubiquitous. 
Fortunately, there is precedent for such a move, and it comes from one of 
the Confrontation Clause’s closest neighbors. In Lafler v. Cooper and 
Missouri v. Frye, the Supreme Court updated the Sixth Amendment’s 
Counsel Clause to make it relevant to today’s criminal legal system.10 This 
Essay shows how the Court could do the same for the Confrontation Clause. 
                                                                                                                           
 5. See infra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 6. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (“[C]riminal justice today is for the 
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”). 
 7. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
 8. Since 2004, the Court has spent hundreds of pages in the United States Reports 
fleshing out what Crawford means for criminal trials. For a list of the cases, see infra note 52. 
Scholars have added tens or hundreds of thousands more. See Sopen B. Shah, Guidelines 
for Guidelines: Implications of the Confrontation Clause’s Revival for Federal Sentencing, 
48 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1039, 1050 (2015) (observing that “Crawford’s revival of the 
Confrontation Clause inspired an industry’s worth of scholarship”); see also Andrew King-
Ries, State v. Mizenko: The Montana Supreme Court Wades into the Post-Crawford Waters, 67 
Mont. L. Rev. 275, 280 (2006) (noting two years after Crawford that “[n]early three hundred 
articles have been written that address the . . . decision”). 
 9. Shaakirrah Sanders and Sopen Shah come the closest to exposing the problem. 
They (separately) argue that the practice of plea bargaining cuts in favor of extending the 
confrontation right past the trial stage of the criminal process into sentencing hearings. See 
Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Unbranding Confrontation as Only a Trial Right, 65 Hastings L.J. 
1257, 1259 (2014) (“Testing the veracity of testimonial statements that are material to 
punishment is as compelling at felony sentencing as at trial . . . .”); Shah, supra note 8, at 
1063 (“The confrontation right—or the probation department’s mere anticipation of the 
confrontation requirement when preparing the [pre-sentence report]—could ameliorate . . . 
situation[s where limited criminal history information was obtained prior to a guilty plea].” 
(citing Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 
UCLA L. Rev. 83, 94 (1988))). I’m sympathetic to their arguments, but the claims I develop 
here—that the confrontation right should apply prior to the trial phase, during plea 
bargaining, and that it entitles defendants to take depositions in aid of the plea bargaining 
process—are very different. 
 10. See Lafler, 566 U.S. at 168–70 (acknowledging the ubiquity of pleas in the criminal 
justice system and extending the right to the effective assistance of counsel to plea 
negotiations); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (“The reality is that plea bargains 
have become so central to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense 
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Here’s the core argument. The Confrontation Clause provides that 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.”11 Crawford recognized that the 
crucial question in implementing this text is figuring out who counts as a 
“witness against” an accused.12 The Court answered the question by de-
fining a witness for purposes of the Confrontation Clause as one who (1) 
makes a “testimonial” statement that (2) the government uses at trial.13 I 
take the “testimonial” component of the definition—which has generated 
a lion’s share of the scholarly attention and case law—as given. Instead, I 
challenge the requirement that the statement be used at trial.14 
The Court’s trial-centric gloss on what it means to be a “witness against” 
an accused is at odds with the reality of the American criminal legal system—
a “post-trial world” where the critical adjudicator is usually a prosecutor, 
not a judge or jury.15 If only “trial witnesses” count as “witnesses,” then in 
a world without trials there can be few “witnesses” and very little confron-
tation. The Court’s restrictive gloss on “witnesses” is also inconsistent with 
the Sixth Amendment’s text, which attaches the confrontation right to 
those facing “criminal prosecution,” not just those in trial.16 And it departs 
from the Court’s treatment of the Sixth Amendment in Lafler and Frye, 
where the Court held that a defendant may assert an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim when their lawyer’s deficient performance caused them 
to miss out on a favorable plea deal.17 In those cases, unlike in Crawford, 
the Court rejected the theory that the Sixth Amendment is meant only to 
ensure a fair trial.18 That was because, as the Court explained in Frye, “ours 
‘is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.’”19 
So then who are the “witnesses against” defendants in a system of pleas? 
They are the people whose “testimony” is used in the only adjudication that 
routinely matters—the plea bargain. The Confrontation Clause, I argue, 
commands that the government confront the defendant with those people, 
and the natural procedural mechanism for such confrontation is a 
deposition. I therefore propose that in the age of plea bargaining, the 
                                                                                                                           
counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met 
to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires . . . .”). 
 11. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
 12. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42–43. 
 13. See infra section II.B. 
 14. See infra section III.C. 
 15. See infra notes 66–68, 109–113 and accompanying text. See generally Jocelyn 
Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 2173 
(2014) (coining the phrase “post-trial world”). 
 16. See infra notes 188–190 and accompanying text. 
 17. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 169–70 (2012) (rejecting the contention that “[a] 
fair trial wipes clean any deficient performance by defense counsel during plea bargaining”); 
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012) (holding that, under the Sixth Amendment, de-
fense counsel must communicate plea offers to their clients). 
 18. See infra section I.B. 
 19. Frye, 566 U.S. at 143–44 (quoting Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170). 
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Confrontation Clause entitles criminal defendants to take the deposition 
of any accusatory “witness” whom prosecutors rely on in plea bargaining.20 
Depositions are not a routine part of criminal practice today in the federal 
system or in most states.21 But a few states already allow criminal defen-
dants to take them, and nothing about the logic of criminal litigation is 
inconsistent with depositions.22 
The objective for “Sixth Amendment depositions” would be to 
incorporate adversarial testing into plea bargaining outcomes. If the 
government’s witnesses performed well under cross-examination, the 
prosecutor’s negotiating leverage would increase, and with it the price of 
a plea. If the witnesses did poorly, that would strengthen the defendant’s 
hand. But whether depositions led to a higher or a lower plea price in any 
particular case, adversarial testing of the government’s evidence would 
have contributed to a fairer and more reliable adjudication.23 That is the 
Confrontation Clause’s purpose.24 By modernizing the confrontation 
right, by bringing it into the twenty-first century (or just the twentieth),25 
the Court could restore some of the adversarial process that plea 
bargaining has upended.26 
The full argument develops in three Parts. Part I describes the 
problem in more detail, Part II diagnoses its doctrinal roots, and Part III 
offers Sixth Amendment depositions as a solution. Part III also considers 
several likely objections to the proposal—that depositions would be too 
costly, that they would burden witnesses, and that they would become just 
one more bargaining chip for prosecutors and defendants to haggle over 
in plea bargaining—and argues that none justifies preserving the status 
                                                                                                                           
 20. See infra section III.A. Because plea bargaining is a fluid process, I look to a fixed 
point—the filing of charges—to determine the class of people on whom the prosecution 
has relied. See infra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 21. See Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal 
Disputes, 79 Brook. L. Rev. 1091, 1094 (2014) (highlighting that typically, criminal discovery 
statutes do not grant defendants formal pretrial information-gathering mechanisms such as 
depositions, interrogatories, and document requests). 
 22. See infra notes 283–297 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra notes 247–250 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 139, 200–201 and accompanying text. 
 25. See generally William Ortman, When Plea Bargaining Became Normal, 100 B.U. 
L. Rev. 1435 (2020) (exploring the intellectual history of plea bargaining in the early- to 
mid-twentieth century). 
 26. See Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 
Harv. L. Rev. 150, 164 (2012) (“Plea bargaining today is fundamentally not adversarial but 
collaborative (some would say collusive).”); see also Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative 
System of Criminal Justice, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2117, 2121 (1998) [hereinafter Lynch, Our 
Administrative System] (noting that the pervasiveness of plea bargaining “has resulted in 
the development of a system of justice that actually looks . . . far more like . . . an 
inquisitorial system than like the idealized model of adversary justice described in the 
textbooks”); James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party 
Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 Yale L.J. 1346, 1472–74 (2015) 
(acknowledging the historical pedigree of certain nonadversarial functions of the court). 
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quo. Finally, a brief Conclusion situates the proposal as an installment 
payment on the project of constitutional criminal procedure modernization 
that the Court started in Lafler and Frye. 
I. A TALE OF TWO CLAUSES 
This Part provides background for the analysis to come. After briefly 
recapping Crawford and its progeny, section I.A explains why Crawford’s 
trial-centric account of confrontation renders the right ineffectual in a 
world with few trials. Section I.B then contrasts the Court’s handling of the 
Confrontation Clause with its handling of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel in Lafler and Frye. The comparison matters not only because the 
two clauses share constitutional text but also because Lafler and Frye are 
proof that Sixth Amendment rights can be modernized. Taken together, 
the sections of this Part demonstrate that two of the major recent 
developments in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence—Crawford, on the one 
hand, and Lafler and Frye, on the other—rest on fundamentally different 
understandings about how American criminal justice works in the twenty-
first century. Crawford imagines a world of trials, whereas Lafler and Frye 
are grounded in the reality of plea bargaining. The Court treats these Sixth 
Amendment neighbors as if they were strangers. 
A. The Marginal Confrontation Clause 
The Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the right 
to cross-examine the government’s in-court witnesses.27 In that respect, it’s 
a pretty straightforward constitutional right.28 But if that were all that it 
did, the government could circumvent it by relying on hearsay evidence 
instead of live testimony.29 An absent hearsay declarant, after all, can’t be 
                                                                                                                           
 27. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (“Our cases construing the 
[Confrontation Clause] hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-
examination . . . .”). 
 28. Difficult questions do arise, even with respect to in-court witnesses. For instance, 
can a witness be physically separated from a defendant? Compare Maryland v. Craig, 497 
U.S. 836, 855–57 (1990) (approving a procedure in which a child-witness testified remotely 
using one-way closed-circuit video), with Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988) (com-
menting that where a screen blocks the witness from seeing the defendant, it is “difficult  
to imagine a more obvious or damaging violation of the defendant’s right to a face-to- 
face encounter”). But as Richard Friedman observes, “For the most part, . . . the boundaries  
of the confrontation right as applied to trial witnesses are tolerably clear.” Richard D. 
Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 Geo. L.J. 1011, 1011–12 
(1998) [hereinafter Friedman, Confrontation]. 
 29. See Richard D. Friedman, The Mold that Shapes Hearsay Law, 66 Fla. L. Rev. 433, 
441 (2014) [hereinafter Friedman, The Mold] (“Suppose . . . the witness does not attend 
trial and that the prosecution attempts . . . to introduce evidence of [the out-of-court 
witness’s] statement . . . . Plainly, such an evasion cannot be allowed, because doing so 
would effectively create a system in which a witness could testify out of court, without 
confrontation.”). 
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cross-examined, at least not in the traditional sense.30 Thus, the Court has 
long understood that the Clause also constrains the government’s reliance 
on hearsay evidence.31 The question is what hearsay evidence runs afoul of 
it. 
Before Crawford, the Court’s answer was to “yoke” the confrontation 
right to the hearsay rules.32 Under the Court’s 1980 decision in Ohio v. 
Roberts, when an unavailable witness’s out-of-court statement fell within a 
“firmly rooted hearsay exception,” the Confrontation Clause posed no 
obstacle to its admissibility.33 Indeed, even when an out-of-court state- 
ment was not admissible under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the 
Confrontation Clause still might not have stood in its way.34 The effect was 
to subordinate the Confrontation Clause to the subconstitutional rules 
governing hearsay. 
That changed in 2004, when the Court announced in Crawford that 
the Confrontation Clause would no longer be tethered to the hearsay 
rules.35 But if not the hearsay rules, what would guide the Confrontation 
Clause’s reach? The Court looked to history, in particular early modern 
English history.36 It used a two-step historical methodology: First identify 
the historical “abuses” that the Confrontation Clause was designed to 
avoid, then determine what contemporary practices are analogous to those 
abuses and ban them.37 Below, we consider part of the Court’s historical 
analysis in depth.38 For now, a brief summary of the reasoning suffices. 
                                                                                                                           
 30. But see John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-
Examination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 191, 196–97 (1999) 
[hereinafter Douglass, Beyond Admissibility] (offering an approach for subjecting hearsay 
to adversarial testing and impeaching hearsay declarants). 
 31. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895) (“The primary object 
of the [Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were 
sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal 
examination and cross-examination of the witness . . . .”). 
 32. David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 3. 
 33. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
 34. See id. (allowing for the possibility that hearsay may be admitted upon a “showing 
of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness”); see also Myatt v. Hannigan, 910 F.2d 680, 
683 n.1, 685 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming the admission of a child-victim’s hearsay statements 
as sufficiently reliable but noting that “both sides agree that Kansas’ child hearsay exception 
is not ‘firmly rooted’ and hence is not presumptively reliable under Roberts”). Courts 
admitting evidence on the “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” logic sometimes 
declined to say whether the hearsay would have qualified under a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 295 F.3d 1018, 1021–23 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(affirming the admission of codefendants’ guilty plea allocutions); United States v. Gallego, 
191 F.3d 156, 167–68 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming the admission of a plea allocution); Sherman 
v. Scott, 62 F.3d 136, 141–42 (5th Cir. 1995) (affirming the admission of laboratory test 
reports). 
 35. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50–51 (2004). 
 36. See id. at 42–43. 
 37. See id. at 44–45, 68. 
 38. See infra notes 143–161 and accompanying text. 
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The principal historical “abuse[]” that the Confrontation Clause was 
designed to avoid, the Court believed, was the use of “ex parte examinations 
as evidence against the accused.”39 A pair of statutes enacted during the 
reign of Queen Mary (in the sixteenth century) had directed justices of 
the peace to examine certain witnesses in felony cases.40 While these 
examinations were not originally meant to substitute for live trial witnesses,41 
the Court reckoned that they eventually “came to be used as evidence” in 
trials.42 As the common law evolved in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, however, it began to recognize the use of ex parte “Marian” 
examinations at trial as abusive.43 By the time the Sixth Amendment was 
adopted, according to the Court’s historical analysis, ex parte examinations 
were admissible against an accused only if the witness was not available to 
testify at trial and the defendant had previously had an opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness.44 
Identifying the historical origins of the Sixth Amendment (or what it 
believed to be the historical origins) was not the end of the Court’s inter-
pretive work. There are no Marian examinations today, so the Court had 
to determine which contemporary practices are so similar to the historical 
“abuses” that they must be proscribed.45 On reaching that question, the 
Court returned to the Confrontation Clause’s text, which, the Court 
reasoned, “reflects” the historical “focus” on ex parte examinations.46 
The Sixth Amendment affords defendants the right to be confronted 
with the “witnesses against” them. A “witness[],” the Court explained, 
citing the 1828 edition of Webster’s Dictionary, is one who “bear[s] 
testimony,” that is, “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”47 A “witness against” a 
criminal defendant is thus (on the Court’s analysis) someone whose 
“testimony” is offered against the defendant. And that includes not only 
those who testify live at trial but also those whose “testimonial” hearsay the 
                                                                                                                           
 39. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. 
 40. They are known as the Marian bail and committal statutes. See id. at 43–44 (citing 
1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554) (Eng.); 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555) (Eng.)). 
 41. See John H. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance: England, Germany, 
France 21–34 (1974) (“The predominant purpose of the statute was to institute systematic 
questioning of the accused and the witnesses.”). 
 42. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44 (citing 2 Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the 
Crown 284 (Sollom Emlyn ed., London, Nutt & Gosling 1736)). 
 43. See id. at 43–47 (“Through a series of statutory and judicial reforms, English law 
developed a right of confrontation that limited these [examination] abuses.”). 
 44. Id. at 54. 
 45. See id. at 51–53 (“Police interrogations bear a striking resemblance to 
examinations by justices of the peace in England.”). 
 46. See id. at 50–51. 
 47. Id. at 51 (third alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting 2 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)). 
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government seeks to use.48 Thus, the Court concluded, “testimonial” 
hearsay cannot be offered against a criminal defendant unless either (1) 
the declarant testifies at trial or (2) the declarant is unavailable and has 
previously been subject to cross-examination by the defendant.49 
This new formulation of the confrontation right raised many ques-
tions, but the most confounding was what it means for hearsay to be 
“testimonial.” The Court declined to offer a “comprehensive definition,”50 
but, drawing again on the history of Marian examinations, it did make one 
seemingly clear point: “Statements taken by police officers in the course 
of interrogations are . . . testimonial under even a narrow standard,” 
because they “bear a striking resemblance to examinations by justices of 
the peace in England.”51 
In the years since Crawford, the Court has decided nine major cases 
fleshing out its new Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.52 Most of them 
have been about the meaning of “testimonial.” Difficult questions have 
emerged in three interrelated contexts: (1) statements to law enforcement 
officials during “emergencies,” (2) laboratory reports, and (3) statements 
by very young children. The first two categories spawned (separate) case 
trilogies but no clear answers. In the emergencies context, the Court first 
decided that some statements made to 911 operators are testimonial while 
others are not, with the distinction turning on whether the “primary 
purpose” was to “enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency” 
(not testimonial) or to gather evidence (testimonial).53 Later, in a fact-
intensive opinion with lots of interesting discussion and few clear 
                                                                                                                           
 48. See id. at 52–53 (“In sum, even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned 
with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object, and interrogations by law enforcement 
officers fall squarely within that class.”). 
 49. Id. at 53–54. The Court noted one historical “deviation” from this rule, for dying 
declarations. Id. at 56 n.6. The Court declined to “decide in this case whether the Sixth 
Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial dying declarations” but noted that 
if the “exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.” Id. 
 50. Id. at 68. The omission drew fire from Chief Justice Rehnquist. See id. at 75 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of 
thousands of state prosecutors need answers as to what beyond the specific kinds of 
‘testimony’ the Court lists[] . . . is covered by the new rule.” (citation omitted)). 
 51. Id. at 52 (majority opinion). 
 52. Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (2015); Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (plurality 
opinion); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011); Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 
(2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 
353 (2008); Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 
(2006). For counting purposes, please note that Davis was consolidated with Hammon v. 
Indiana. Davis, 547 U.S. at 813 n.*. Two of the cases resolved discrete legal points about the 
Confrontation Clause’s scope. Whorton handled two such points, ruling first that Crawford 
was not a “watershed” decision that would apply retroactively and second that after Crawford, 
“nontestimonial” statements were not subject to any Confrontation Clause scrutiny. 549 U.S. 
at 420–21. Giles, decided the next year, clarified that a defendant forfeits their right to confront 
a witness when they “engage[] in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying.”  
554 U.S. at 359. 
 53. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828. 
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guideposts, the Court ruled that a gunshot victim’s statements to police 
officers about who shot him weren’t testimonial because they’d been made 
in the context of an ongoing emergency.54 In the laboratory test trilogy, 
the Court held first that a forensic report identifying a substance as drugs 
was testimonial, and thus inadmissible without testimony from the 
certifying technician;55 then that the testimony of a different technician 
(who didn’t perform the test) was not an adequate substitute;56 and finally 
(in a plurality decision) that a technician could testify about a forensic 
analysis performed and certified by a nontestifying technician from an 
altogether different laboratory.57 The Court addressed the final category 
in its most recent major confrontation case, Ohio v. Clark, yielding  
an unusually clear rule—that the statements of very young children to 
teachers and other caregivers are typically, and perhaps always, non-
testimonial.58 
To summarize the last seventeen years of Confrontation Clause juris-
prudence, we’ve seen a landmark criminal procedure decision premised 
on how sixteenth-century statutes evolved in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, followed by more than a half-dozen Supreme Court 
decisions refining, confining, and questioning the resulting legal doctrine. 
For jurists, law professors, and law students interested in history or doc-
trinal puzzles, the Crawford “revolution” has been tremendous intellectual 
fun.59 
But intellectual stimulation aside, has the revitalized Confrontation 
Clause mattered very much in the real world of criminal cases? Does the 
ordinary criminal defendant have greater access to adversarial testing of 
the government’s case than they did before Crawford? It’s unlikely. That’s 
because Crawford and the Confrontation Clause doctrine it begot are trial-
centric, but we inhabit a post-trial world. 
Consider again Crawford’s definition of “witnesses” as “those who 
‘bear testimony.’”60 The Court meant those who bear testimony at trial.61 
                                                                                                                           
 54. Bryant, 562 U.S. at 377–78. 
 55. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310–11. 
 56. Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 663. 
 57. Williams, 567 U.S. at 79. 
 58. Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 247–48 (2015). Adding to the uncertainty, since the 
decision in Clark, both Justice Scalia—Crawford’s author and principal defender—and 
Justice Kennedy—arguably its leading critic from the bench—have departed the Court. For 
analysis of Crawford’s future in a post-Scalia and -Kennedy Court, see generally Pardo, supra 
note 3. 
 59. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 60. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (quoting 2 Noah Webster, An 
American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)). 
 61. In this respect Crawford was consistent with suggestions (short of holdings) in the 
Court’s earlier cases that the confrontation right applies only at trial. See Barber v. Page, 
390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (surmising that the “right to confrontation is basically a trial 
right”); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53 n.9 (1987) (plurality opinion) 
(Powell, J.) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause only protects a defendant’s trial rights, and does 
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Thus, in criticizing the Roberts approach to confrontation, the Court 
observed that “the Constitution prescribes a procedure for determining 
the reliability of testimony in criminal trials, and we, no less than the state 
courts, lack authority to replace it with one of our own devising.”62 The 
Court made no effort to justify the “at trial” limitation, perhaps because 
the point appeared self-evident to Crawford’s author, Justice Scalia. Part II 
of the opinion begins by positing a range of definitions of “witness,” each 
of which assumed a trial: “One could plausibly read ‘witnesses against’ a 
defendant to mean those who actually testify at trial,” Scalia wrote, or 
“those whose statements are offered at trial,” or (as the Court ultimately 
found) “something in-between.”63 In Crawford’s wake, moreover, lower 
courts have (with very few exceptions) understood that when the Court 
said “witnesses,” it meant “witnesses at trial.”64 
                                                                                                                           
not compel the pretrial production of information that might be useful in preparing for 
trial.”). Importantly (for purposes of the claim Part III develops), Justice Blackmun 
concurred and wrote separately in Ritchie, denying Justice Powell the fifth vote he needed 
for a majority, because Blackmun did “not accept the plurality’s conclusion . . . that the 
Confrontation Clause protects only a defendant’s trial rights and has no relevance to pretrial 
discovery.” Id. at 61 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 62. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added); see also id. at 50–51 (“[W]e once again 
reject the view that the Confrontation Clause applies of its own force only to in-court 
testimony, and that its application to out-of-court statements introduced at trial depends upon 
‘the law of Evidence for the time being.’” (emphasis added) (quoting 3 John Wigmore, A 
Treatise on Evidence § 1397, at 101 (2d ed. 1923))). Justice Scalia was even more 
unequivocal about the “at trial” limitation in his pre-Crawford dissent in Maryland v. Craig, 
writing that “[t]he phrase [‘witness against’] obviously refers to those who give testimony 
against the defendant at trial.” 497 U.S. 836, 865 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 63. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42–43. Though less important, the Crawford doctrine’s trial-
centrism can also be seen in how it evaluates whether statements are “testimonial.” Only 
out-of-court statements that the declarant would reasonably expect to be used at trial count. 
See id. at 51–52. While this limitation is merely implied in Crawford, it is explicit in the 
Court’s post-Crawford cases. In Bryant, Justice Sotomayor explained for the Court that when 
the “primary purpose of an interrogation” is “not to create a record for trial,” the statement 
is not testimonial. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011); see also Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009) (“Business and public records are generally 
admissible absent confrontation . . . because—having been created for the administration 
of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial—
they are not testimonial.”). This limitation is problematic. Considering that only a tiny 
fraction of criminal cases go to trial, see infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text, even 
someone reporting a crime to police in an ordinary, nonemergency interrogation should 
not rationally expect their report to be used at a trial. Richard Friedman has formulated the 
meaning of testimony as “the transmittal of information for use in prosecution.” Richard D. 
Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of Testimonial, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 241, 251 (2005) 
[hereinafter Friedman, Meaning of Testimonial] (emphasis added). 
 64. See, e.g., Vanmeter v. State, 165 S.W.3d 68, 74–75 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (“[W]e 
conclude that Crawford did not change prior law that the constitutional right of confron-
tation is a trial right, not a pretrial right which would transform it into a ‘constitutionally 
compelled rule of [sic] discovery.’” (quoting Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 52) (misquotation)); State 
v. Zamzow, 892 N.W.2d 637, 646 (Wis. 2017) (“We agree with those jurisdictions in 
concluding that the Confrontation Clause does not apply during suppression hearings.”). 
But see Curry v. State, 228 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (“To deny a defendant the 
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Crawford thus created a confrontation right that excludes certain evi-
dence that prosecutors might otherwise use against defendants at trials. By 
definition, that right cannot bear (at least not directly) on criminal cases 
that are resolved by means other than trial.65 There are no “witnesses” in 
such cases, as the Court defines the term, and so nobody for defendants to 
be confronted with. And the vast majority of criminal cases are resolved by 
means other than trial. According to the commonly cited figures, ninety-
seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state 
convictions are secured by guilty pleas,66 many of which are entered 
pursuant to some sort of agreement.67 As the Supreme Court famously 
remarked in a case we examine closely in section I.B, plea bargaining “is 
not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice 
system.”68 
Crawford, and the cases implementing and refining it, thus created a 
robust confrontation right that applies to a tiny fraction of criminal cases. 
This is likely why Crawford’s practical consequences have been more muted 
than its critics warned.69 In the laboratory test cases, the Justices debated 
                                                                                                                           
protections afforded by the Confrontation Clause at [a suppression hearing] essentially 
denies him his only opportunity to ensure that the evidence presented against him is 
reliable.”); Zamzow, 892 N.W.2d at 652 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (“The text of the Sixth 
Amendment does not use the word ‘trial’ in stating the accused’s confrontation right.”). 
Many of the lower court cases are collected and analyzed in an excellent student note. See 
Christine Holst, Note, The Confrontation Clause and Pretrial Hearings: A Due Process 
Solution, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1599, 1613–18. 
 65. At least not with respect to the guilt phase of a criminal prosecution. For an 
argument that the confrontation right should attach to sentencing proceedings, see generally 
Sanders, supra note 9 (proposing “uniform application at felony sentencing of the Sixth 
Amendment’s structurally identical Counsel, Jury Trial, and Confrontation Clauses”). 
 66. These figures trace to the Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 
134, 143 (2012) (citing Sean Rosenmerkel, Matthew Durose & Donald Farole, DOJ, Felony 
Sentences in State Courts, 2006—Statistical Tables 1 (2009), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf [https://perma.cc/BH6F-2W7U] (last updated Nov. 22, 
2010); Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 5.22.2009, Univ. Albany, 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222009.pdf [https://perma.cc/4M6E-ZUTX] 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2020)). 
 67. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911, 912 & n.1 (2006) (indicating that most felony guilty pleas result from 
plea bargains); Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 1225, 1228 (2016) (“Plea bargaining, or some comparable form of abbreviated, 
consent-based adjudication process, is widely and routinely relied upon in criminal justice 
systems worldwide as an alternative to trials.”). 
 68. Frye, 566 U.S. at 144 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Robert E. Scott 
& William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). 
 69. See Catherine Bonventre, The Implementation of Judicial Policy by Crime 
Laboratories: An Examination of the Impact of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts 71 (2015) 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University at Albany, State University of New York) (ProQuest) (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (describing the effects of Melendez-Diaz as “muted”); see also 
Erin Murphy, The Mismatch Between Twenty-First-Century Forensic Evidence and Our 
Antiquated Criminal Justice System, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 633, 661 (2014) (“Even the most 
robust discovery and confrontation regimes will have little impact on the overwhelming 
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whether requiring testimony from technicians would be a significant 
burden on states. Writing for the Court in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, Justice 
Ginsburg explained that because few criminal cases make it to trial, the 
burden would be minimal.70 In dissent, Justice Kennedy predicted that 
“rigorous empirical studies . . . detailing the unfortunate effects of 
[requiring technician testimony] are sure to be forthcoming.”71 Who was 
right? In a 2015 dissertation, Catherine Bonventre reported the results of 
a survey of forensic laboratory personnel about the consequences of the 
Court’s decisions.72 “In general,” she found, “the impact of [the case law] 
that emerged from the survey was not the catastrophe predicted by the 
dissenting Justices,” explaining that the “majority of the respondents 
reported minimal increases in personal appearances at trial, defense 
subpoenas, and in-court testimony in specific forensic disciplines.”73 As 
Bonventre recognized, an important factor contributing to her findings 
was “the role of guilty plea dispositions in minimizing the impact of 
requiring live testimony on the administration of justice.”74 
It may be, however, that while the confrontation right does not bear 
directly on a large share of criminal cases, it nonetheless influences the 
prices that prosecutors and defendants negotiate for guilty pleas.75 If so, it 
might be indirectly affecting a broad swath of criminal cases. Though 
possible, this is unlikely, because of how plea bargaining works in the 
American criminal legal system. A defendant’s trial rights come bundled—
he must take them all, by going to trial, or leave them all, by pleading 
guilty.76 But the choice is often more theoretical than real. That’s because 
                                                                                                                           
majority of cases so long as those entitlements do not materialize until a case is set for 
trial.”). 
 70. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 667 (2011). 
 71. Id. at 683 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 72. Bonventre, supra note 69, at 57–69. 
 73. Id. at 71. 
 74. Id. at 110; see also Richard D. Friedman, The Sky Is Still Not Falling, 20 J.L. & Pol’y 
427, 438–39 (2012) [hereinafter Friedman, The Sky] (positing that the assertion of a 
confrontation right could, in some circumstances, be seen as “game-playing” and hamper 
the defendant’s ability to reach a favorable plea bargain). 
 75. See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow 
of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 951 (1979) (developing a framework “to 
consider how the rules and procedures used in court for adjudicating disputes affect the 
bargaining process” in divorce courts). Justice Breyer raised this possibility at the oral 
argument in Melendez-Diaz, speculating about how the Court’s ruling might affect bargain-
ing leverage. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 
U.S. 305 (2009) (No. 07-591). 
 76. For intriguing claims that criminal trial rights are or could be “unbundled,” see 
generally Gregory M. Gilchrist, Trial Bargaining, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 609, 614 (2016) (“Trial 
bargaining occurs where the defendant waives only limited trial rights, thus preserving a 
trial that is shorter, cheaper, less uncertain, or some combination thereof, in exchange for 
limited leniency.”); John Rappaport, Unbundling Criminal Trial Rights, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
181, 181 (2015) (“Criminal defendants can, and sometimes do, ‘unbundle’ their jury trial 
rights and trade them piecemeal, consenting to streamlined trial procedures to reduce their 
sentencing exposure.”). 
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prosecutors usually enter plea negotiations with all or nearly all of the 
leverage. They can credibly threaten that if the defendant goes to trial and 
is convicted, his punishment will be far worse than if he pleads guilty.77 By 
doing so, they can price the bundle of trial rights out of reach for most 
defendants. 
An example will illustrate. Imagine that you are indicted for 
marijuana distribution and possession of a firearm. The prosecutor offers 
you a deal—fifteen years. But, she tells you, if you insist on a trial and lose, 
she will seek—and she expects the judge will impose—a sentence of fifty-
five years.78 Now imagine that the government’s case turns on a confi-
dential informant who says that you sold him marijuana while wielding a 
gun. If the jurors believe the informant, you’re done. If they don’t, you’ll 
probably be acquitted. You know that there’s a chance that if your lawyer 
cross-examines the informant, he’ll poke holes in the informant’s story 
and expose him for the liar you know him to be. But witnesses are 
unpredictable. Is the chance worth forty years of your life? Probably not. 
And because she knows that it’s not, the prosecutor can safely ignore your 
lawyer when he insists that the informant is lying. 
Confrontation at trial is an element in a bundle of rights that few 
defendants can credibly threaten to exercise. Accordingly, confrontation’s 
value as a negotiating chip in plea bargaining is usually slight.79 In our 
system of pleas, coercive trial penalties relegate confrontation to the 
margins of criminal justice. 
                                                                                                                           
 77. See William Ortman, Second-Best Criminal Justice, 96 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1061, 1071–
73 (2019) [hereinafter Ortman, Second-Best] (summarizing the literature on trial penalties). 
 78. The plea–trial sentencing differential in the example replicates the trial penalty in 
a real case. Weldon Angelos was sentenced to fifty-five years in federal prison for marijuana 
distribution and firearm possession after turning down the prosecutor’s offer of fifteen 
years. See Jamie Fellner, An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How U.S. Federal Prosecutors Force 
Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty, 26 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 276, 276 (2014). Aside from the 
sentencing differential and the charges, however, the example is hypothetical. 
 79. There is a possible exception—domestic violence cases. Immediately after Crawford 
was decided, many observers expressed concern about the case’s implications for domestic 
violence prosecutions. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 Va. L. 
Rev. 747, 749 (2005); see also Carol A. Chase, Is Crawford a “Get Out of Jail Free” Card for 
Batterers and Abusers? An Argument for a Narrow Definition of “Testimonial”, 84 Or. L. 
Rev. 1093, 1093–95 (2005); Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: 
Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 311, 311 
(2005). Domestic violence cases frequently turn on the testimony of a single witness—the 
victim—and victims often recant or refuse to testify at trial. Lininger, supra, at 768. Prior to 
Crawford, prosecutors relied on victims’ hearsay statements—often in 911 calls or to police 
officers—rather than live trial testimony. Id. at 773, 776–77. Crawford obviously made it more 
difficult to rely on that kind of hearsay. Yet it is unclear whether Crawford actually had a 
long-term impact on domestic violence prosecutions. No retrospective empirical study that 
I have found examines the question. While it is possible that Crawford affected the mix of 
domestic violence cases selected for prosecution, it is also possible that even in this context, 
a trial-centric confrontation right doesn’t matter very much in world of pervasive plea 
bargaining. 
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B. Confrontation’s Neighbor 
In the previous section, we saw that Crawford’s trial-centrism leaves the 
Confrontation Clause with an ephemeral relationship to the real world of 
criminal cases.80 This section juxtaposes the Court’s recent treatment of 
the Confrontation Clause with its handling of the Sixth Amendment’s 
Counsel Clause.81 The comparison is useful because the two clauses—
separated by only ten words—share the same introductory text, which 
specifies the bearer of both rights (the “accused”) and their scope (“all 
criminal prosecutions”).82 But the comparison is relevant for a deeper 
reason as well: It demonstrates that Sixth Amendment rights can be 
modernized for the real world of criminal justice. The Court’s recent 
Counsel Clause cases are thus evidence that the Confrontation Clause 
need not be obsolete. 
The Court’s key moves came in a pair of cases decided in 2012—Lafler 
v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye.83 In Lafler and Frye, criminal defendants 
sought postconviction relief on the grounds that their lawyers had 
rendered ineffective assistance (thus depriving them of the “assistance of 
counsel” guaranteed by the Counsel Clause) during plea negotiations.84 
Anthony Cooper (the defendant in Lafler) had been charged with an array 
of crimes in Michigan, including assault with intent to murder, after an 
incident in which he fired a gun at a person.85 Though he’d been inclined 
to accept the prosecutor’s plea offer to a sentence of fifty-one to eighty-five 
months, he rejected it based on his lawyer’s novel and nonsensical belief 
that Cooper could not be convicted of attempted murder because he’d 
shot the victim “below the waist.”86 (Note for first-year law students and 
bar-takers: This is not a legal defense to attempted murder.) Cooper 
proceeded to trial and was convicted, whereupon he received the 
mandatory minimum sentence of 185 to 360 months.87 Galin Frye, 
meanwhile, had been charged in Missouri with operating a vehicle while 
his license was revoked, an offense carrying up to four years.88 The 
prosecutor sent Frye’s lawyer a letter offering to resolve the case in one of 
two ways—either Frye could plead to a misdemeanor and serve a ninety-
day sentence, or he could plead to a felony and immediately serve ten days 
in jail.89 The letter gave Frye a deadline (about a month and a half later) 
                                                                                                                           
 80. See supra section I.A. 
 81. U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for his defence.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012). 
 84. See Lafler, 566 U.S. at 160; Frye, 566 U.S. at 138. 
 85. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 160–61. 
 86. Id. at 161. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Frye, 566 U.S. at 138. 
 89. Id. at 138–39. 
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to make his choice.90 But Frye’s lawyer never told Frye about the 
prosecutor’s letter, and the offers expired.91 Frye subsequently entered an 
“open” guilty plea—i.e., he pled guilty without an agreement with the 
prosecutor—and was sentenced to three years in prison.92 
In both cases, a lawyer’s incompetence led a defendant to lose a 
favorable plea offer. By the time the cases reached the Supreme Court, 
prosecutors made no attempt to justify the defense lawyers’ performances. 
Instead, they argued “prejudice.”93 To win relief on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim under the famous (or infamous) Strickland test, 
a defendant must show not only that his lawyer performed inadequately, 
but also that the lawyer’s incompetence prejudiced him.94 In the Supreme 
Court, the state prosecutors (and the United States as amicus) contended 
that neither defendant was prejudiced by the lawyers’ failings because they 
received full and fair process after the missed plea offers—for Cooper a 
trial and for Frye a valid guilty plea.95 
In 5-4 decisions, the Court, per Justice Kennedy, rebuffed the 
prosecutors’ arguments.96 The Court noted first that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel “extends to the plea-bargaining process,” such that 
defendants are “entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel” 
during plea negotiations.97 It then explained that “in the context of pleas,” 
Strickland’s prejudice element means that a defendant “must show the 
outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent 
advice.”98 In Cooper’s case, where his lawyer’s incompetent advice had led 
him to reject a favorable offer, that meant that he would have to show a 
“reasonable probability” that, but for the advice, he would have accepted 
the offer and the trial court would have signed off.99 As to Frye, whose 
lawyer didn’t even communicate the prosecutor’s offer, it meant that he 
would need to “demonstrate a reasonable probability [that he] would have 
accepted the earlier plea offer” had he known about it, and that the plea 
would have not have been cancelled by the prosecutor or rejected by the 
trial court.100 The Court ruled that Cooper had made his showing and 
                                                                                                                           
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 139. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 174 (2012); Brief for the Petitioner at 18–19, Frye, 
566 U.S. 134 (No. 10-444), 2011 WL 1593613. 
 94. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694–95 (1984); see also Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57–60 (1985) (applying Strickland to a case involving a negotiated 
guilty plea). 
 95. See Lafler, 566 U.S. at 164–65; Frye, 566 U.S. at 141–42. 
 96. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 160, 164–65, 175, 187; Frye, 566 U.S. at 138, 141–45, 151. 
 97. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 162 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). 
 98. Id. at 163. 
 99. Id. at 164. 
 100. Frye, 566 U.S. at 147. 
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remanded the case to the lower courts to work out the remedy.101 It 
remanded Frye’s case for a determination of whether he too had satisfied 
Strickland’s prejudice element.102 
On one level, these outcomes seem obvious. Cooper and Frye were 
sentenced to spend additional years in prison because they had incom-
petent lawyers. If the right to counsel in the Sixth Amendment means 
anything, it must surely condemn that.103 The obviousness of Lafler and 
Frye, however, obscures the subtle jurisprudential move that the Court 
made in these cases. As Justice Scalia explained in dissent, the prosecutors 
had support in the Court’s cases.104 That’s because the Court’s pre-Lafler 
and Frye jurisprudence was consistent with a trial-centric theory of the 
Counsel Clause. 
“Until today,” Justice Scalia declared, exaggerating only slightly, it 
had been “entirely clear” that “the right to effective assistance has as its 
purpose the assurance of a fair trial.”105 Scalia pointed out that in the 
Court’s earlier cases dealing with ineffective assistance in plea bargaining, 
Padilla v. Kentucky and Hill v. Lockhart, lawyers’ incompetence had caused 
defendants to take bad plea deals, not to miss good ones.106 If the Sixth 
Amendment’s exclusive purpose is to assure a fair trial, as Scalia claimed, 
that procedural distinction makes all the difference. When a defendant 
relies on incompetent advice to plead guilty, he has been wrongly deprived 
of his right to a fair trial. When he relies on incompetent advice to plead 
not guilty, on the other hand, he still gets a trial. He hasn’t given up 
anything of constitutional significance and, in Scalia’s view, he has suffered 
no prejudice. Justice Scalia insisted that the Sixth Amendment demands 
effective counsel for the “acceptance of a plea offer,” but not the rejection 
of one.107 
The majority spurned Justice Scalia’s trial-centric view of the Counsel 
Clause. Rejecting his claim that the Sixth Amendment’s “protections 
are . . . designed simply to protect the trial,” the Court instead embraced 
a fair prosecution model of the Counsel Clause.108 And the Court made clear 
why it was doing so. “[T]he right to adequate assistance of counsel cannot 
be defined or enforced,” the Court observed in Lafler, “without taking 
                                                                                                                           
 101. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 174–75. 
 102. Frye, 566 U.S. at 151. 
 103. See Gerard E. Lynch, Frye and Lafler: No Big Deal, 122 Yale L.J. Online 39, 39–40 
(2012) (“The only surprise about the Supreme Court’s recent decisions . . . is that there 
were four dissents.”); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for 
a Festering Wound, 51 Duq. L. Rev. 673, 674–75 (2013) [hereinafter Alschuler, Two Small 
Band-Aids]. 
 104. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 177–81 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. at 178. 
 106. Id. at 177; Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 
(1985). 
 107. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 177 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 108. See id. at 165 (majority opinion). 
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account of the central role plea bargaining plays in . . . determining 
sentences.”109 Noting statistics showing that the vast majority of criminal 
convictions are based on guilty pleas, the Court in Frye explained that 
“ours ‘is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials,’” and 
“the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is 
almost always the critical point for a defendant.”110 Given that ground 
truth, the Court reasoned, the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel must 
assign defense lawyers “responsibilities in the plea bargain process.”111 
“Anything less,” the Court observed, “might deny a defendant effective 
representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice 
would help him.”112 
The Court thus fashioned a Sixth Amendment right to counsel for the 
actual criminal legal system, a system in which a plea bargain is, as Josh 
Bowers puts it, “the expected mode of disposition.”113 For Justice Scalia, 
this was madness, as the Constitution envisions trials as the ordinary vehicle 
for criminal prosecutions.114 The disagreement between the Court and 
Scalia in these cases implicated a deep question—whether constitutional 
rules should be written for the world as it exists, with all its messy 
compromises and complexities, or for the normative world in which 
constitutional first principles hold.115 The majority ruled for reality. 
The Court’s opinions in Lafler and Frye can be understood as 
examples of a mode of constitutional interpretation that Lawrence Lessig 
dubs “translation.”116 “Context matters” in reading legal texts, Lessig 
observes, but it changes over time, exposing gaps between the “context of 
                                                                                                                           
 109. Id. at 170. 
 110. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012) (quoting Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170). 
 111. Id. at 143. 
 112. Id. at 144 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Massiah v. United States, 
377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964)). 
 113. Josh Bowers, Plea Bargaining’s Baselines, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1083, 1087 (2016) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 114. See Lafler, 566 U.S. at 185 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In the United States, we have 
plea bargaining aplenty, but until today it has been regarded as a necessary evil.”). 
 115. To be clear, this is not an easy question. Imagine that you think that plea bargain-
ing fundamentally perverts the criminal legal system. A constitutional rule that regulates 
plea bargaining might well lead to a more sensible plea-bargaining regime. But it may also 
further normalize the practice, making a world without plea bargaining even less likely. On 
the other hand, a constitutional rule that prioritizes the constitutional first principle of trials 
would leave the unregulated “Wild West” of plea bargaining in place, leading to discrete 
injustices in cases like Lafler and Frye, but at least it wouldn’t put another nail in the coffin 
of trials. I explore this dynamic in Ortman, Second-Best, supra note 77. 
 116. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165, 1189–211 (1993) 
[hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity in Translation]; see also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity & Constraint: 
How the Supreme Court Has Read the American Constitution 49–64 (2019) [hereinafter 
Lessig, Fidelity & Constraint]. For a review of Lessig’s theory of translation, see Cass R. 
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 941–
42 (2003). 
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the writing” and the “context of the reading.”117 A legal interpreter com-
mitted to remaining “faithful” to legal texts thus “needs a way to neutralize 
or accommodate the effect that changing context may have on meaning.”118 
Enter “translation,” a “device for rendering a reading of a text in the target 
context (usually a judicial opinion) that preserves the meaning of the 
source text.”119 Translation, Lessig explains, “aims to achieve the same 
meaning in the target context that a faithful reading of the source context 
would have produced.”120 
This was the Court’s approach in Lafler and Frye. No one could 
plausibly claim that there was a Sixth Amendment right to counsel for plea 
bargaining when the Sixth Amendment was adopted. Because plea 
bargaining didn’t exist (in any meaningful sense) in the Founding Era, 
such a claim would be incoherent.121 But defendants had the right to have 
a lawyer assist them with the critical part of their criminal cases. It just so 
happened that, in the Founding Era, the critical part of a criminal case was 
a trial. That’s why the Counsel Clause meant a right to counsel for trial in 
its “source context.” But between 1791 and 2012, the context changed, 
with plea bargaining replacing trial as the critical part of most criminal 
cases. The Court’s core holding in Lafler and Frye—that today there is a 
right to counsel for plea bargaining—translated the Counsel Clause to 
preserve its meaning in a new context.122 
The Supreme Court decisions analyzed closely in this Part—Crawford, 
Lafler, and Frye—understand twenty-first century American criminal justice 
very differently. Lafler and Frye are built for the world of plea bargaining; 
Crawford is decidedly not. The result is a Sixth Amendment at odds with 
itself. Its Counsel Clause stands ready (more or less) to deliver the right to 
counsel to defendants in the age of plea bargaining.123 Its Confrontation 
Clause, meanwhile, serves up the “crucible of cross-examination” mostly 
on paper. 
                                                                                                                           
 117. Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 116, at 1175; see also Lessig, Fidelity & 
Constraint, supra note 116, at 56. 
 118. Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 116, at 1177. 
 119. Lessig, Fidelity & Constraint, supra note 116, at 56. 
 120. Id. 
 121. On the lack of plea bargaining at the Founding, see Albert W. Alschuler, Plea 
Bargaining and Its History, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 7–16 (1979). 
 122. My point is not to endorse “translation” as a general model of constitutional 
interpretation. It is (more modestly) to suggest that Lessig’s theory aptly describes what the 
Court did in Lafler and Frye. 
 123. “More or less” because while Lafler and Frye broke jurisprudential ground, they are 
a far cry from thoroughgoing plea-bargaining reform. For critical perspectives on the 
decisions, see Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargain Negotiations: Defining Competence Beyond 
Lafler and Frye, 53 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 377, 407 (2016); Alschuler, Two Small Band-Aids, supra 
note 103, at 674–77. The point is comparative. At least the Court paid attention to plea 
bargaining and tried to make the right to counsel relevant. See Alkon, supra, at 407 
(“Through its decisions in Lafler and Frye, the Supreme Court is finally showing a willingness 
to more critically examine plea bargaining to better protect defendants’ rights.”). 
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II. UPDATING CONFRONTATION 
This Part explores the doctrinal roots of the problem Part I identifies. 
One source of trouble, section II.A explains, is that the Court has long 
treated the Confrontation Clause as if it directly governs when hearsay can 
be used by prosecutors in criminal trials. I argue that this approach is 
mistaken. Although the Confrontation Clause has implications for the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence, it announces a substantive right, not an 
evidentiary rule. The rest of this Part concerns the most critical phrase in 
the Confrontation Clause—“witnesses against.” Section II.B briefly fills out 
details of the Court’s current approach to defining who is a “witness 
against” an accused. Section II.C does the Essay’s doctrinal heavy lifting. It 
takes aim at the Court’s position that “testimony” (whether live or hearsay) 
must be used at trial to turn its maker into a “witness” for purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause. This limitation is both textually unnecessary and 
purpose defeating. The Court should instead deem a person a 
Confrontation Clause “witness” if their “testimony” is used against a 
defendant in a “critical adjudication,” a class of procedures that in today’s 
criminal legal system would include both trials and plea bargains. 
A. Confrontation as a Substantive Right 
As we see later in this Part, updating the Confrontation Clause for a 
post-trial world means taking it beyond the courtroom.124 Before we get 
there, we need to do some doctrinal brush clearing. The Supreme Court 
has long treated the Confrontation Clause (as it pertains to information 
from people not testifying live in court) as a rule governing the admissibility 
of evidence.125 It construes the Confrontation Clause, that is, as giving 
defendants the right to have certain hearsay excluded under certain 
circumstances.126 John Douglass calls this the Court’s “exclusionary 
thinking” about confrontation.127 It is an obstacle in our path. If the Con-
frontation Clause is merely a rule of admissibility, it plainly has nothing to 
say about what goes on outside of courtrooms. This section clears the way 
forward by showing that the Confrontation Clause is properly understood 
as creating a substantive right, not an evidentiary one.128 
                                                                                                                           
 124. See infra section II.C. 
 125. The Clause includes other rights with respect to in-court witnesses. See supra note 
28 and accompanying text. 
 126. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 127. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 30, at 194; see also Eileen A. Scallen, 
Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three-Dimensional Confrontation 
Clause, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 623, 628 (1992) (“When the Supreme Court focuses only on the 
evidentiary dimension of confrontation, however, the other dimensions of the 
Confrontation Clause fade into the background . . . .”). 
 128. In that it is a rule of constitutional criminal procedure, it might be more fully de-
scribed as a “substantive rule of criminal procedure.” That more elaborate phrasing is unwieldy 
(and unnecessary). 
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In an article published shortly before Crawford, Douglass explained 
that the Court’s exclusionary thinking about confrontation dominated 
both before and during the era of Ohio v. Roberts.129 What he couldn’t know 
at the time was whether the approach would survive the demise of Roberts. 
But survive it did.130 The Court thus wrote in Crawford that the Framers of 
the Sixth Amendment “would not have allowed admission of testimonial 
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial.”131 And the leading 
evidence treatise explains that Crawford “established a new mode of 
analyzing how the Confrontation Clause regulates admission of hearsay.”132 
What is wrong with the admissibility approach to confrontation? 
Begin with the Sixth Amendment’s text. The Confrontation Clause, recall, 
provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”133 Nowhere 
does it mention the admissibility of evidence,134 but it easily could have. 
The clause might have provided that “no witness may testify against a 
defendant without confrontation,” which would have sounded in admis-
sibility. Instead, it bestows a specific right on a criminal defendant—the 
right to “be confronted with” a person—that applies to anyone who 
qualifies as a “witness against” him.135 
The text is describing a substantive right, not an evidentiary one. 
Evidentiary rules exclude evidence because the evidence isn’t relevant or 
reliable. The Confrontation Clause works differently. As Richard Friedman 
observes, the Confrontation Clause “does not prescribe that a piece of 
evidence is inadmissible because there is some defect in the evidence 
itself.”136 Instead, it demands a process—cross-examination.137 As the 
Court itself explained in Crawford, the Confrontation Clause “commands, 
not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular 
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”138 And the 
Confrontation Clause’s demand for cross-examination contributes directly 
to the Sixth Amendment’s broader purpose—ensuring an adversarial 
                                                                                                                           
 129. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 30, at 197–219. For a discussion of the 
Roberts approach to confrontation, see supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
 130. See Brooks Holland, Crawford & Beyond: How Far Have We Traveled from Roberts 
After All?, 20 J.L. & Pol’y 517, 537 (2012) (“Crawford hitched confrontation’s wagon to an 
exclusionary rule without clearly defining the right itself.”). 
 131. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004) (emphasis added). 
 132. Kenneth S. Broun, George E. Dix, Edward J. Imwinkelried, David H. Kaye & 
Eleanor Swift, McCormick on Evidence § 252(A) (Robert P. Mosteller ed., 8th ed. 2020) 
(emphasis added). 
 133. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
 134. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 30, at 224 (“The text says nothing of 
excluding a witness’s testimony.”). 
 135. See Friedman, The Mold, supra note 29, at 440–41. 
 136. Id. at 441. 
 137. See id. at 440 (“[The Sixth Amendment] seems to say quite clearly that the accused 
has a right to insist that those who testify against him be brought in his presence . . . .”). 
 138. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
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criminal process in which an accused has the “tools,” as Randolph Jonakait 
puts it, “to challenge the evidence against him.”139 
Still, it should probably not be a surprise that the Court hewed to an 
admissibility approach during the Roberts era. Part I explains that Roberts 
tied confrontation to the subconstitutional rules governing hearsay,140 and 
those are quintessential rules of admissibility. It is more puzzling that the 
Court persisted in its exclusionary thinking about confrontation in 
Crawford, which detached the confrontation right from the hearsay rules.141 
But while Crawford separated confrontation from the specific details of 
hearsay law, and especially from the hearsay exceptions, it retained hearsay 
law’s focus on evidentiary admissibility. 
The text and purposes of the Sixth Amendment may not support an 
admissibility approach to the Confrontation Clause, but Crawford directs 
us to focus on history, especially early modern English history.142 Can we 
account for the persistence of “exclusionary thinking” using the historical 
methodology that Crawford prescribed? We can, but only superficially. 
Crawford’s key historical “finding” was that by the time the Sixth 
Amendment was adopted, English common law courts excluded out-of-
court witness statements unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant.143 The Court based that conclusion principally 
on four cases—a misdemeanor case, Rex v. Paine, decided in 1696,144 and 
three felony cases decided between 1787 and 1791.145 In the misdemeanor 
and one of the felonies, judges excluded out-of-court examinations 
because the defendants had not been afforded the opportunity to cross-
examine the accusers.146 In another of the felonies, the court permitted 
the jury to hear the accusation because the defendant had been present 
for her accuser’s deposition.147 And in the remaining felony, the court 
                                                                                                                           
 139. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative 
History, 27 Rutgers L.J. 77, 114 (1995); see also Holland, supra note 130, at 537; Sklansky, 
supra note 32, at 64–67. 
 140. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra notes 36–44 and accompanying text. 
 143. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45–47. 
 144. R v. Paine (1696) 87 Eng. Rep. 584, 5 Mod. 163, 165. 
 145. R v. Dingler (1791) 168 Eng. Rep. 383, 384, 2 Leach 561, 563; R v. Woodcock 
(1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 354, 1 Leach 500, 503–04; R v. Radbourne (1787) 168 Eng. Rep. 
330, 331–32, 1 Leach 457, 457–61. 
 146. See Dingler, 168 Eng. Rep. at 384, 2 Leach at 562 (excluding evidence because “in 
the course which has been perused by [the magistrate], as the prisoner was not present, no 
judicial examination has been taken, as he could not have the benefit of cross-
examination”); Paine, 87 Eng. Rep. at 585, 5 Mod. at 165 (“[T]he Chief Justice declared, 
that it was the opinion of both Courts that these depositions should not be given in evidence, 
the defendant not being present when they were taken before the mayor, and so had lost 
the benefit of a cross-examination.”). 
 147. Radbourne, 168 Eng. Rep. at 332, 1 Leach at 461 (noting the prosecution’s 
argument that the victim’s deposition “was admissible as an information taken by a regular 
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admitted the accusation as a dying declaration, but indicated (in dicta) 
that it would otherwise have to be excluded.148 
All four of Crawford’s principal historical cases thus were about the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence at trial. But the cases share another 
distinctive feature. In each, the hearsay declarant was dead by the time of 
trial.149 When an accuser dies without being cross-examined, confronta-
tion is (obviously) impossible. Thereafter the only way to avoid denying 
the accused their confrontation right at trial is to exclude the out-of-court 
accusation.150 That’s exactly what happened in Rex v. Paine, the 
misdemeanor, and in Rex v. Dingler, the most on-point of the felony 
cases.151 The exclusion of hearsay evidence in those cases was not a 
function of the confrontation right alone, but the combination of the 
confrontation right and a dead declarant. 
A broader look at early modern English cases reveals that 
confrontation and evidentiary admissibility are independent concepts.152 
The confrontation right that took shape in the eighteenth century 
developed in part as a reaction to the political “state trials” of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, where defendants were often denied the 
opportunity to confront their accusers “face-to-face.”153 As the nineteenth-
century historian James Fitzjames Stephens explained, the “proof” in 
these cases was “usually given by reading depositions, confessions of 
accomplices, [and] letters,” a practice that “occasioned frequent demands 
by the prisoner to have his ‘accusers,’ i.e., the witnesses against him, 
brought before him face to face.”154 Note that the defendants were not 
asking the judges or juries to disregard the depositions, confessions, and 
                                                                                                                           
magistrate, under the statutes of Philip & Mary; for it had been given in the presence and 
hearing of the prisoner”). 
 148. Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353, 1 Leach at 502 (explaining that examination “was 
not taken, as the statute directs, in a case where the prisoner was brought before him in 
custody; the prisoner therefore had no opportunity of contradicting the facts it contains”). 
 149. The felonies were all homicide cases in which the declarant was the victim. Dingler, 
168 Eng. Rep. at 383, 2 Leach at 561; Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. at 352, 1 Leach at 500–01; 
Radbourne, 168 Eng. Rep. at 331–32, 1 Leach at 459–60. In Paine, the declarant was the 
witness to whom the defendant’s allegedly libelous writing was delivered. 87 Eng. Rep. at 
584, 5 Mod. at 163–64. 
 150. The dying declaration exception to confrontation may come into play, though, as 
it did in Woodcock. See 168 Eng. Rep. at 352–54, 1 Leach at 501–04. 
 151. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 152. In Crawford, the Court recounted aspects of the broader history but then looked 
elsewhere when formulating its admissibility-focused holding. See Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 43–45 (2004). 
 153. See Friedman, Confrontation, supra note 28, at 1024; see also 30 Charles Wright, 
Kenneth W. Graham, Jr. & Daniel D. Blinka, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6321 (2d ed. 
2020). 
 154. 1 James Fitzjames Stephens, A History of the Criminal Law of England 326 (1883); 
see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 (quoting Stephens, supra). 
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letters. They wanted something else—to confront the people who made or 
spoke them.155 
The most prominent example of this phenomenon was the treason 
trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.156 At Raleigh’s trial, the Attorney General 
(Edward Coke himself) read ex parte confessions by Henry Brooke 
(usually referred to by his title, Lord Cobham), implicating Raleigh in a 
plot against King James I.157 Raleigh demanded that Lord Cobham testify. 
“[L]et my accuser come face to face and be deposed,” Raleigh insisted, 
observing the irony that “[w]ere the case but for a small copyhold, you 
would have witnesses or good proof to lead the jury to a verdict; and I am 
here for my life!”158 As John Douglass explains, Raleigh’s demand was “for 
confrontation, not for the exclusion of evidence.”159 And Raleigh’s 
example is only the most prominent. In an earlier treason trial, during the 
reign of King Edward VI, the Duke of Somerset “objected . . . many things 
against the Witnesses, and desired they might be brought face to face.”160 
Defendants’ demands for confrontation were, to be sure, often rebuffed.161 
But the denials were among the historical “abuses” that, as the Supreme 
Court explained in Crawford, hastened the confrontation right of the late 
eighteenth century.162 
The state trials support the claim that the Confrontation Clause 
should not be understood as a rule that exclusively governs the 
                                                                                                                           
 155. See Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 30, at 237 (explaining that the “Star 
Chamber battles focused on confrontation, not on exclusion of hearsay”). 
 156. Raleigh’s trial is described in David Jardine, Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, in 1 
Criminal Trials 400 (1832). For accounts of the Raleigh trial’s significance on the 
development of the confrontation right, see Allen D. Boyer, The Trial of Sir Walter Ralegh: 
The Law of Treason, the Trial of Treason and the Origins of the Confrontation Clause, 74 
Miss. L.J. 869, 869 (2005); Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay: 
Requiring Foundational Testing and Corroboration Under the Confrontation Clause, 81 
Va. L. Rev. 149, 150 (1995). For a fascinating look at Raleigh’s life and trial, see Anna Beer, 
Patriot or Traitor: The Life and Death of Sir Walter Ralegh (2018). 
 157. See Jardine, supra note 156, at 410–11. 
 158. Id. at 427. 
 159. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 30, at 237. 
 160. See Proceedings Against Edward Duke of Somerset, for High Treason and Felony, 
at Westminster: 5 Edward VI AD 1551., in 1 A Complete Collection of State Trials and 
Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors from the Earliest 
Period to the Year 1783, at 515, 520 (T.B. Howell ed., 1816). 
 161. Sir Raleigh’s request, for instance, was denied because (as the Chief Justice 
explained) Lord Cobham “having first confessed against himself voluntarily, and so charged 
another person, if we shall now hear him again in person, he may for favour or fear retract 
what formerly he hath said, and the jury may, by that means, be inveigled.” Jardine, supra 
note 156, at 427. 
 162. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004); see also Friedman, Confrontation, 
supra note 28, at 1024 (“[B]eginning even before the middle of the sixteenth century, we 
find repeated demands by treason defendants that their accusers be brought ‘face-to-face,’ 
and also repeated statutory support for this position. By the middle of the seventeenth 
century, this position, and the accused’s right to examine the witness, had prevailed.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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admissibility of evidence. It is instead a substantive right of a criminal 
defendant to “confront” (or “be confronted with”) the government’s 
“witnesses” via cross-examination. That right has critical implications for 
the admissibility of hearsay evidence, but treating it as a rule that directly 
governs admissibility—as the Supreme Court has long done—skips several 
steps. 
Here is how the Court in Crawford should have explained the connec-
tion between the Confrontation Clause and the admissibility of testimonial 
hearsay. As a substantive right, the Confrontation Clause doesn’t directly 
prohibit the government from using any evidence, hearsay or otherwise. 
Rather, it dictates what happens after the government uses a witness’s 
testimony (including an out-of-court witness’s “testimonial hearsay”) 
against a defendant.163 Namely, it tells us that the defendant must “be 
confronted with” that witness.164 But imagine that the government uses 
“testimonial hearsay” against a defendant, and—for whatever reason—
does not confront the defendant with the witness. Perhaps the declarant 
is dead, making confrontation impossible, or perhaps the government just 
prefers the declarant’s hearsay to what they’d say in court. Unless an 
exception to the Confrontation Clause applies, the government’s failure 
to confront the defendant with the witness violates the Sixth 
Amendment.165 This is where the Confrontation Clause’s indirect effect on 
the admissibility of evidence comes into play. When the government uses 
testimonial hearsay against a defendant in circumstances where 
confrontation will not be forthcoming, a Sixth Amendment violation 
becomes inevitable.166 In order to avoid inevitable (or even just probable) 
Sixth Amendment violations, courts exclude uncrossed testimonial 
hearsay at trial. But the exclusion of evidence is, strictly speaking, 
prophylactic. It’s the failure of confrontation following the introduction of 
                                                                                                                           
 163. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 164. This assumes, of course, that the defendant has not previously cross-examined the 
declarant. If the defendant has cross-examined the declarant, however, and if the declarant 
has since become unavailable, Crawford provides that further confrontation isn’t constitu-
tionally required. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. 
 165. Thus, if the defendant is convicted, the conviction will have to be set aside, unless 
perhaps the error could be deemed harmless. On harmless error analysis of Confrontation 
Clause violations, see Daniel Epps, Harmless Errors and Substantial Rights, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 
2117, 2167–68 (2018); John M. Greabe, Criminal Procedure Rights and Harmless Error: A 
Response to Professor Epps, 118 Colum. L. Rev. Online 118, 123–27 (2018). See generally 
David H. Kwasniewski, Note, Confrontation Clause Violations as Structural Defects, 96 
Cornell L. Rev. 397 (2011) (discussing the Confrontation Clause and harmless error review 
jurisprudence). 
 166. The inevitability of a violation is most obvious, of course, where the declarant is 
dead or otherwise unavailable. 
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testimonial hearsay—not the testimonial hearsay itself—that would actu-
ally violate the Sixth Amendment.167 
Thus the Confrontation Clause regulates the admissibility of 
testimonial hearsay indirectly. Courts want to avoid Sixth Amendment 
violations, and for good reason. Accordingly, they do not permit prosecutors 
to offer evidence that would likely or inevitably lead to a Confrontation 
Clause violation. But the Confrontation Clause’s evidentiary implications 
are just that—implications. The main show is the substantive right of 
defendants to confront the witnesses against them. And as we will see, that 
right can be invoked in settings that have nothing to do with the 
admissibility or inadmissibility of hearsay at trial. 
B. Witnesses Against: The Conventional Account 
We have seen that the Confrontation Clause is best understood as 
creating a substantive right, rather than an evidentiary rule governing the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence.168 Because we are working with a 
substantive right, we need to consider the two questions that together 
delineate any substantive right: (1) When does it apply (or “attach,” in 
criminal procedure lingo), and (2) what does it entitle its holder to have 
or do?169 The remainder of this Part explores the “attachment” question. 
I take up the second question in Part III. 
Determining when the confrontation right “attaches” is deceptively 
simple, because the text of the Confrontation Clause appears to provide 
an easy answer. The right to “be confronted,” the Sixth Amendment tells 
us, attaches to a “witness[] against” an “accused” in a “criminal 
prosecution[].”170 This formulation, of course, just shifts the inquiry. What 
does it mean for a person to be a “witness against” a criminal defendant? 
This section examines the Supreme Court’s current answer to that 
question, which comes mostly from Crawford. Because we’ve already 
encountered aspects of the Court’s key moves in defining a “witness 
against” in Crawford, the discussion here can be brief.171 
                                                                                                                           
 167. For a somewhat similar argument, see Friedman, The Mold, supra note 29, at 441 
(“[T]he procedural requirement of the Confrontation Clause is necessarily enforced by 
means of an evidentiary rule of exclusion.”). 
 168. See supra section II.A. 
 169. This framework for understanding individual rights is most familiar from the 
procedural due process context. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) 
(canonical case on what procedural due process requires); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 
261–63 (1970) (canonical case on whether procedural due process applies); see also Note, 
Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest 
Balancing, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1510, 1510 (1975) (“Due process adjudication typically involves 
two analytically distinct issues: whether the right to due process is applicable; and, if so, what 
procedures must be provided.”). 
 170. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
 171. See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text. 
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Under the Court’s current approach, a person becomes a witness 
against an accused when two elements are present: (1) The person makes 
an out-of-court “testimonial statement,”172 and (2) the statement is used 
by the government at the accused’s criminal trial.173 This section considers 
each element in turn. 
A large share of the post-Crawford writing about the Confrontation 
Clause, both in the United States Reports and in the pages of law reviews, 
has been about the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial 
statements.174 As Part I explains, Crawford declared that a witness is one 
who “bear[s] testimony,” and testimony is “typically ‘a solemn declaration 
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact.’”175 Only statements that do that, the Court decided in Crawford, can 
trigger the Confrontation Clause.176 The testimonial/nontestimonial distinc- 
tion has its supporters and detractors in the academy,177 and on the 
Court.178 And then there is the difficult matter of figuring out what testi-
monial means in a variety of litigated contexts, a project that has frequently 
                                                                                                                           
 172. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004). 
 173. See id. at 50–51 (“[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was 
directed was the . . . use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”). 
Arguably, the second element should be further limited to instances in which the statement 
is used to prove the truth of the matter which it asserts, the traditional definition of hearsay. 
In Crawford, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985), 
that out-of-court statements offered for propositions other than the truth of what they assert 
raise no Confrontation Clause problems. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 n.9. The Crawford Court 
did not specifically say that the reason nonhearsay statements are constitutionally 
unproblematic is that their declarants are not “witnesses against” the accused, but that was 
the explanation in Street. 471 U.S. at 414. That explanation makes sense. With a nonhearsay 
statement—for instance a verbal act—the declarant’s veracity does not matter. 
 174. See supra notes 52–62 and accompanying text; see also Sabine Gless, AI in the 
Courtroom: A Comparative Analysis of Machine Evidence in Criminal Trials, 51 Geo. J. Int’l 
L. 195, 232 (2020) (“The meaning of the word ‘testimonial,’ or rather, the type of witness 
that will trigger the Confrontation Clause, has been the subject of vigorous debates.”). 
 175. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 Noah 
Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)); see also supra notes 47–
49 and accompanying text. 
 176. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 177. Compare, e.g., Friedman, The Sky, supra note 74, at 428 (“But it appeared to me 
that the basic principle of Crawford was so obviously correct, so fundamental to our 
system, . . . and so far superior to what had prevailed before, that prosecutors and judges as 
well as those on the defense side would quickly come to accept it. Silly me.”), with George 
Fisher, The Crawford Debacle, 113 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 17, 17 (2014) (“[T]here’s 
no denying [the] doctrine’s a muddle, if not as conceived, then as realized.”). 
 178. Compare Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 252 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“Crawford sought to bring our application of the Confrontation Clause back to its original 
meaning, which was to exclude unconfronted statements made by witnesses—i.e., 
statements that were testimonial.” (emphasis omitted)), with Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 
564 U.S. 647, 678 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[P]rinciples have weaved in and out of 
the Crawford jurisprudence. Solemnity has sometimes been dispositive, and sometimes not. 
So, too, with the elusive distinction between utterances aimed at proving past events, and 
those calculated to help police keep the peace.” (citations omitted)). 
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divided the Court in cases decided over the last seventeen years.179 These 
debates are interesting, but they are for another day. All we need to say  
is that under Crawford, a defendant’s confrontation right attaches only  
when a person makes a testimonial statement—whatever that means. Of  
course, the Court might someday replace the testimonial/nontestimonial 
distinction in favor of some other limitation on what kinds of out-of-court 
statements can trigger the confrontation right.180 For our purposes—
understanding the structure of the confrontation right—any such new 
approach would simply slide into the position that “testimonial” 
occupies currently. 
Uttering a “testimonial” statement does not, by itself, make a person 
a “witness against” an accused. Rather, the speaker is a “witness” under 
Crawford only if their statement is used against a defendant at trial.181 
There are two pieces to this requirement—that the testimony be used by 
the government, and that it be used at trial.182 We’ve already assessed the 
Court’s trial-centric gloss on the Confrontation Clause,183 but we need to 
focus briefly on the other part of this requirement, that the government 
actually use the evidence. 
American courtrooms operate on the principle of party control of the 
evidence.184 This principle means that a nonparty cannot (typically) 
become a “witness” unilaterally; rather, they have to be called by a party.185 
The same logic applies to people made “witnesses” by dint of their out-of-
court “testimony.” A person who has made a testimonial statement is 
eligible to become a witness against a defendant, but until their statement 
is actually used by a prosecutor, they are not one. The point may sound 
needlessly formalistic, but it isn’t. During the course of an investigation, 
many people might provide tips to the police, and, under virtually any 
definition, those tips will qualify as “testimonial” statements. But police 
receive lots of unhelpful tips of no value to them or to prosecutors. These 
                                                                                                                           
 179. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. 
 180. Some scholars, for instance, have suggested that the question should be whether a 
statement is “accusatory.” See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Confrontation 
Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & Pol’y 791, 847–49 (2007) (“Limiting the 
Confrontation Clause’s operation to accusations . . . would not be inconsistent with the 
principles that underlie Crawford.”); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging 
and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 511, 544 (2005) [hereinafter 
Mosteller, Confrontation of Witnesses] (“When a statement is accusatory and intended to be 
conveyed beyond those who would be expected to keep it confidential . . . it should be 
considered testimonial.”). 
 181. See supra notes 172–174 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra notes 172–174 and accompanying text. 
 183. See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text. 
 184. See, e.g., Mirjan R. Damaska, Evidence Law Adrift 74–75 (1997) (describing how 
the adversarial system reserves to litigants the power to decide what evidence will be 
gathered, introduced, and presented in court for proof). 
 185. Or, at least in some jurisdictions, they can be called to testify by the judge. See Fed. 
R. Evid. 614(a) (“The court may call a witness on its own or at a party’s request.”). 
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“unused” tips, despite being testimonial, obviously trigger no confron-
tation rights.186 
C. Witnesses Against: Updated Account 
A quick recap for those just joining us—under current law, criminal 
defendants have the right to be confronted with anyone whose 
“testimonial” hearsay is used against them at trial.187 This section makes 
the case for revisiting the last two words of this test. My argument mirrors 
the Court’s in Lafler and Frye. To put it simply—denying a defendant 
confrontation during plea bargaining makes no more sense than denying 
him an effective lawyer during plea bargaining. But I need to back up. 
As a preliminary matter, the Court’s “at trial” limiting principle has 
no anchor in the text of the Sixth Amendment. The amendment’s 
opening phrase makes clear that the Confrontation Clause applies to 
“criminal prosecutions,” not just to trials.188 That same phrase, moreover, 
applies to the Counsel Clause, and we see in section I.B that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel applies to at least one stage of a “criminal 
prosecution” (plea bargaining) that is entirely independent of trial.189 It’s 
not impossible that the single phrase “criminal prosecution” in the Sixth 
Amendment means different things for different clauses, but that reading 
is awkward.190 
                                                                                                                           
 186. The Court confirmed that testimonial statements must be used to trigger the 
Confrontation Clause by approving “notice-and-demand” statutes for laboratory analyst 
testimony in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 326–27 (2009). These statutes, 
the Court explained, “require the prosecution to provide notice to the defendant of its 
intent to use an analyst’s report as evidence at trial,” at which point the defendant has the 
opportunity (and obligation) to object under the Confrontation Clause. Id. The statutes 
make sense only if the defendant’s confrontation right is triggered by the government’s use 
of testimonial statements, and not their mere existence. 
 187. See supra section II.B. 
 188. U.S. Const. amend VI; see also Friedman, Meaning of Testimonial, supra note 63, 
at 250 (“Indeed, it seems the confrontation right should be independent of a right to 
trial.”). Friedman goes on to note that “[e]ven if there were no proceeding recognizable as 
a trial—even if all testimony were recorded and delivered piecemeal behind closed doors to 
a fact-finder—the accused should have a right to confront the witness.” Friedman, Meaning 
of Testimonial, supra note 63, at 250–51. In a very rough sense, this foreshadows what this 
Essay proposes in Part III. 
 189. See supra notes 108–115 and accompanying text. 
 190. See John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital 
Sentencing, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1967, 2009 (2005) (“The text suggests that, whenever the 
rights of notice, confrontation, compulsory process, and counsel apply, they apply together. 
All of those rights are in the same sentence, which, as a matter of simple grammar, lists them 
collectively as the rights an accused ‘shall enjoy’ ‘in all criminal prosecutions.’” (quoting 
U.S. Const. amend. VI)). 
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That said, the text by itself is hardly dispositive.191 The bigger reason 
for revisiting the “at trial” limitation is that, in our post-trial world, it drains 
the confrontation right of meaning. To develop this part of the argument, 
I’ll need to explain what would replace “at trial.” It takes a doctrine to beat 
a doctrine.192 
In lieu of the “at trial” limitation in the current definition of a Con-
frontation Clause “witness,” I propose substituting “critical adjudication.” 
On this approach, confrontation would attach whenever the government 
uses a person’s (1) testimonial hearsay at (2) a critical adjudication.193 The 
limitation is borrowed from the Court’s Counsel Clause jurisprudence, so 
we need to take a quick detour back to that corner of the Sixth Amendment. 
The Court has long held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
applies only in “critical stages” of criminal prosecutions.194 It has artic-
ulated the distinction between critical and noncritical stages in various 
ways over the years.195 One of the most useful formulations was from 
                                                                                                                           
 191. It rarely is on questions involving the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (“The Constitution’s text does not alone resolve this 
case.”). 
 192. This is a variant of the well-known (among law professors anyway) expression that 
“[i]t takes a theory to beat a theory.” See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, In Praise of Legal 
Scholarship, 25 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 801, 815 (2017) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: It Takes  
a Theory to Beat a Theory, Legal Theory Blog, https://lsolum.typepad.com/ 
legaltheory/2018/07/legal-theory-lexicon-it-takes-a-theory-to-beat-a-theory.html [https:// 
perma.cc/GQ6Z-H8UL] (last modified July 8, 2018)). 
 193. In principle, it would be possible to eliminate the “at trial” limitation and not 
replace it with anything. On that reading, a defendant’s confrontation right would attach 
whenever the government uses a person’s testimonial statement against him at any point in 
a criminal prosecution. We needn’t go that far to make the Confrontation Clause relevant 
in today’s criminal legal system. The Supreme Court has insinuated that the Confrontation 
Clause does not apply at preliminary hearings, see Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968), 
and the state and lower courts have, for the most part, taken the Court’s hint, see supra note 
64. Updating the Confrontation Clause does not require calling the holdings of those cases 
into question. It does require questioning their dicta. See supra note 61. 
 194. E.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 165 (2012). For noncritical stages, defendants 
can (constitutionally) be left to fare for themselves. Examples of noncritical stages include 
photo identifications, see United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317–18 (1973), and 
handwriting exemplars, see Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967). 
 195. See Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292, 297–316 (6th Cir. 2007) (reviewing Supreme Court 
and Sixth Circuit cases). Drawing from the Court’s cases, the leading criminal procedure 
treatise sets forth the following complex, multipart test for determining whether a stage is 
critical: 
In determining whether a judicial proceeding meets the “critical stage” 
standard, a court must ask: (1) whether the proceeding either (i) had a 
consequence adverse to the defendant as to the ultimate disposition of 
the charge which could have been avoided or mitigated if defendant had 
been represented by counsel at that proceeding, or (ii) offered a potential 
opportunity for benefitting the defendant as to the ultimate disposition 
of the charge through rights that could have been exercised by counsel, 
and (2) whether that adverse consequence could have been avoided, or 
2021] CONFRONTATION IN THE AGE OF PLEA BARGAINING 481 
Coleman v. Alabama: “The determination . . . depends . . . upon an analysis 
‘whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in 
the . . . confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that 
prejudice.’”196 The Court shed additional light on the meaning of a critical 
stage in United States v. Wade, observing that the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel reaches “pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle 
the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.”197 
Combining Coleman and Wade, a “critical stage” is a proceeding where the 
outcome of a defendant’s case may be prejudiced by not having a lawyer 
at his side.198 By guaranteeing a defendant the assistance of counsel at 
those proceedings, the Sixth Amendment (in Wade’s words) “assure[s] 
that the accused’s interests will be protected consistently with our 
adversary theory of criminal prosecution.”199 
The same “adversary theory of criminal prosecution” animates the 
Confrontation Clause.200 As the Court noted in Maryland v. Craig, the 
Confrontation Clause’s purpose is “ensuring that evidence admitted 
against an accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing 
that is the norm of Anglo-American criminal proceedings.”201 That said, 
the benefits of adversarial process can be realized more easily in the 
confrontation context than in the right to counsel arena. Whereas 
defendants need counsel for every proceeding in which their rights are at 
stake, they don’t need to repeatedly confront the government’s witnesses in 
order to ascertain the strength (or lack thereof) of the government’s 
                                                                                                                           
the lost opportunity regained, by action that subsequently provided 
counsel could have taken. Answering these inquiries will require a court 
to examine various features of the procedural rules of the particular 
jurisdiction. 
3 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King & Orin S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 11.2(b) 
(4th ed. 2019). 
 196. 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)). 
 197. 388 U.S. at 224. 
 198. See Van, 475 F.3d at 313 (“In order to assess if a given portion of a criminal 
proceeding is a critical stage, we must ask how likely it is that significant consequences might 
have resulted from the absence of counsel at the stage of the criminal proceeding.”). 
 199. 388 U.S. at 227. 
 200. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (“The common-law tradition 
is one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing, while the civil law condones 
examination in private by judicial officers.”); Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the 
Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 557, 585–86 (1988) 
(“[W]hile confrontation, in its service to the adversary system, may concomitantly advance 
the truth-determining process, confrontation’s mission, like the mission of other sixth 
amendment rights, is to help guarantee the adversary system.”); see also Mosteller, 
Confrontation of Witnesses, supra note 180, at 514 (explaining that “the positive procedural 
goal of the confrontation right” is “encouraging and ensuring that evidence is presented in 
the courtroom in the presence of the accused and subject to adversarial testing”). 
 201. 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990). 
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case.202 In the context of confrontation, the “adversary theory of criminal 
prosecution” means that a defendant must have the opportunity to test 
the government’s witnesses at some point before or during the 
adjudication that actually resolves his case. Hence a “critical adjudication” 
standard. Just as the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants a 
lawyer at each critical stage, it should be understood to guarantee the 
confrontation of the witnesses against them in adjudications that “might 
well settle [their] fate.”203 
So which parts of modern criminal procedure count as “critical 
adjudications”? Trials count, of course. They may not happen very often, 
but when they do, they certainly “settle the accused’s fate,” subject to 
appeal. Preliminary hearings don’t count. As the Supreme Court observed 
in Barber v. Page, a “preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching 
exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its 
function is the more limited one of determining whether probable cause 
exists to hold the accused for trial.”204 A similar logic would probably apply 
as to other pretrial hearings (e.g., suppression hearings) that do not 
implicate the ultimate merits of a case.205 
Then there is plea bargaining. Even a glance at the contemporary 
criminal legal system should leave no doubt about its status. The Supreme 
Court has already told us that plea bargaining is the adjudication that 
matters for almost every defendant. In a passage of Frye that we encounter 
in Part I, the Court was forthright about that fact, observing that “ours ‘is 
for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials,’” such that “the 
negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost 
always the critical point for a defendant.”206 And within the plea 
bargaining system, the key adjudicators are prosecutors. As Gerard Lynch 
(now a Second Circuit Senior Judge) wrote in an influential article, an 
“alien anthropologist” sent from Mars to study our criminal legal system 
would recognize that the “substantive evaluation of the evidence and 
assessment of the defendant’s responsibility . . . in the office of the 
prosecutor” is the “actual adjudication process for criminal cases.”207 If 
you are persuaded that the confrontation right should apply to critical 
                                                                                                                           
 202. This is why, under Crawford, testimonial hearsay may be used at trial against a 
defendant who has previously had the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. See supra 
note 49 and accompanying text. 
 203. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 224–27. 
 204. 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968). 
 205. See supra note 64. 
 206. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012) (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 
156, 170 (2012)). 
 207. Lynch, Our Administrative System, supra note 26, at 2123; see also Rachel E. 
Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative 
Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 869, 876–77 (2009); Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The 
Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 
Am. J. Crim. L. 223, 248 (2006). 
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adjudications other than trial, extending it to plea bargaining should not 
be a further stretch. 
To be sure, there are practical difficulties in recognizing plea 
bargaining as a “critical adjudication.” That’s because plea bargaining is an 
informal process and the information on which participants rely can shift 
quickly,208 making it tricky to determine whose statements the govern- 
ment has “used.” But there is a fixed point in the process: the criminal 
charge. In the age of plea bargaining, a charge functions as the starting gun 
for plea negotiations (except when they’ve begun already) and is a 
prerequisite (or at least a corequisite) for any plea.209 My proposal thus 
looks to the charge as the crucial moment for fixing Confrontation Clause 
witnesses. In the age of plea bargaining, the confrontation right should 
attach as to any person whose “testimony” the government relies on to 
charge a defendant. For ease of discussion, I call these people the govern-
ment’s “charging witnesses.” 
The argument for this approach to the Confrontation Clause does not 
depend on the notion that anyone in 1791, on either side of the Atlantic, 
thought confrontation rights should apply to charging witnesses. The 
argument is not originalist in that sense.210 That said, the approach is 
                                                                                                                           
 208. See Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 Calif. L. Rev. 553, 568 & n.77 
(2013) (“Plea bargaining can be a dynamic process, and the parties can manipulate the 
parts comprising the record of conviction all the way up to the moment that the disposition 
is submitted to the court for approval.”); see also Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, 
Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 Penn St. L. Rev. 1155, 1159 
(2005). 
 209. See Brian M. Murray, Prosecutorial Responsibility and Collateral Consequences, 
12 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 213, 221 (2016) (“[P]rosecutors decide the charges from the start, 
thereby setting the terms of the negotiation . . . .”). The parenthetical caveats in the text are 
because plea negotiations sometimes begin before prosecutors file formal charges, even 
during the pendency of an investigation. This is especially common in white-collar criminal 
matters. See Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26 Stan. L. & Pol’y 
Rev. 61, 70 (2015). 
 210. There are plausible historical antecedents for a pretrial right to confrontation. In 
the sixteenth century, Parliament enacted a statute providing that in treason cases, the 
accusers, “at the tyme of the arraynement[,] . . . yf they be then livinge, shalbe brought in 
pson before the partie soe accused.” 5 & 6 Edw. 6 c. 11, § 9 (1552) (Eng.). Similar provisions 
appear at 1 & 2 Phil. & M. c. 10, § 11 (1554) (Eng.), and 13 Car. II, c. 1, § 5 (1661) (Eng.). 
It is unclear, however, whether defendants were permitted to ask questions of the arraign-
ment witnesses. A single (rather ambiguous) sentence from Matthew Hale suggests that they 
were. 1 Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown 306 (Sollom Emlyn ed., 
London, Nutt & Gosling 1736) (“[T]he statute requires, that [the witnesses] be produced 
upon the arraignment in the presence of the prisoner to the end that he may cross examine 
them.”). But this would be surprising in light of the (apparent) fact that cross-examination 
by the defendant was uncommon even at trial in the Tudor era. See John Bellamy, The 
Tudor Law of Treason: An Introduction 160 (1979). Another plausible antecedent for a 
right to pretrial confrontation looks to the examinations conducted under the Marian bail 
and committal statutes at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth 
century. Robert Kry examined the records of more than two dozen such examinations used 
in London trials in 1789. Robert Kry, Confrontation Under the Marian Statutes—A 
Response to Professor Davies, 72 Brook. L. Rev. 493, 513–16 (2007). Based on that review 
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consistent with the historical practice of confrontation in precisely the 
same way that the Court’s approach in Lafler and Frye was consistent with 
the historical practices surrounding the right to counsel.211 Part I explains 
that the Supreme Court “translated” the Sixth Amendment Counsel 
Clause (in the Lessig sense of translation), such that the meaning of the 
clause in its original context—ensuring that defendants had the assistance 
of counsel for the important part of their criminal cases—continues to 
govern in an era where plea bargaining is the important part of criminal 
cases.212 My approach to confrontation works just the same way.213 
It makes sense that the Confrontation Clause, like the Counsel Clause, 
began life as “basically a trial right.”214 In the criminal legal system of the 
Founding, trial was the only kind of critical adjudication that the system 
knew.215 Confrontation at trial thus fully satisfied the desire for adversarial 
testing of the government’s witnesses. But meaning depends on context,216 
and the relevant context has changed dramatically. For better or worse, 
                                                                                                                           
(and other legal materials of the era), Kry concluded that “Marian depositions were 
routinely conducted in the prisoner’s presence” and that “[a]t some point before the 
framing, that practice hardened into a procedural right.” Id. at 527; see also Thomas Y. 
Davies, Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in Crawford’s “Cross-Examination Rule”: A Reply 
to Mr. Kry, 72 Brook. L. Rev. 557, 569 (2007) (criticizing Kry’s analysis, sometimes harshly, 
but acknowledging that Kry’s “description of the evolution of English Marian practice . . . 
[is] plausible”). As with the earlier treason statutes, the availability of cross-examination is 
less clear. Kry concludes that “at the time of the framing, the right to cross-examine at a 
committal hearing was not firmly established.” Kry, supra, at 541. But, he continues, the 
“post-framing” evidence for a right to cross-examination is clearer, as “[e]very reported 
American decision to address the issue conditioned the admissibility of a committal 
examination on presence, and in most cases expressly on opportunity to cross-examine.” Id. 
at 551. Even so, it is difficult to say whether, in the early decades of the nineteenth century, 
defendants had an affirmative right to cross-examination in Marian examinations or merely 
a right not to have evidence from uncrossed examinations used against them at trial. Both 
views can be found in Kry’s sources. Compare State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103, 104 
(Super. Cts. L. & Eq. 1794) (“[O]ur act of Assembly . . . clearly implies the depositions to 
be read, must be taken in [the defendant’s] presence”), with People v. Restell, 3 Hill 289, 
300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (“The legislature has thus carefully provided that the defendant 
shall have the opportunity to cross-examine, and if that right is not enjoyed, the deposition 
cannot be read in evidence against him on the trial.”). The Tudor/Stuart treason statutes 
and the Marian examination procedure of the eighteenth and nineteenth century each 
provided some kind of pretrial confrontation, but given the uncertainties surrounding cross-
examination, I do not rely on either in making the case for updating the modern 
confrontation right to account for plea bargaining. 
 211. See supra section I.B. 
 212. See supra notes 116–122 and accompanying text. 
 213. As noted above, my point is not to defend translation as a general approach to 
constitutional interpretation. See supra note 122. I lack both the space and the inclination 
to weigh in on that question. My claim is only that if translation is appropriate for the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, it’s appropriate for the Sixth Amendment confrontation right 
as well. 
 214. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968). 
 215. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
2021] CONFRONTATION IN THE AGE OF PLEA BARGAINING 485 
our criminal legal system uses two kinds of critical adjudications—trials, in 
a few cases, and plea bargains, in the rest. A criminal defendant’s access to 
confrontation needn’t and shouldn’t hinge on which adjudicatory path 
their case takes. 
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT DEPOSITIONS 
This Part introduces and seeks to justify “Sixth Amendment depositions” 
as the mechanism for putting the updated Confrontation Clause into 
practice. Section III.A makes the affirmative case for depositions. After 
walking through how depositions would work, it argues that they would 
lead to better-informed plea prices, making plea bargaining fairer and 
more reliable. It also reflects briefly on the irony that a constitutional 
provision meant to end the practice of “trial by deposition” could, through 
the twists and turns of history, come to actually require depositions in 
criminal cases. Section III.B considers how a defendant’s right to conduct 
Sixth Amendment depositions could be enforced. It suggests that an 
exclusionary rule—under which prosecutors would be barred from calling 
Sixth Amendment witnesses not made available for deposition—could be 
an effective tool. Section III.C evaluates potential objections. Would depo-
sitions cost too much?217 Would they unduly burden witnesses?218 While 
these are serious objections, they do not justify maintaining the status  
quo, which denies the confrontation right to the vast majority of crim- 
inal defendants. Section III.C also considers whether depositions would 
become just one more thing for prosecutors and defendants to negotiate 
about.219 Would prosecutors demand that defendants waive depositions in 
exchange for a plea? In some cases, of course, they would, or they would 
try. But we know empirically that defendants do regularly exercise their 
pretrial rights, for instance when they move to suppress unconstitutional 
searches. The same would likely be true of depositions. Defendants would 
take depositions in cases where depositions would be valuable and trade 
them in cases where they would not. 
A. Confrontation by Deposition 
We have seen that the Sixth Amendment confrontation right should 
attach as to any “witness” whose testimonial hearsay the government relies 
on to charge a criminal defendant (i.e., the government’s “charging 
witnesses”).220 The question remains: What does the updated confron-
tation right entitle defendants to do? The answer, of course, is cross-
examination.221 But when? At what point in a criminal proceeding should 
                                                                                                                           
 217. See infra section III.C.1. 
 218. See infra section III.C.2. 
 219. See infra section III.C.3. 
 220. See supra Part II. 
 221. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (“[The Confrontation Clause] 
commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular 
486 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:451 
defendants be entitled to cross-examine the government’s charging 
witnesses? 
We can dispense with an implausible option—that cross-examination 
of the government’s charging witnesses at trial is sufficient. As a practical 
matter, that option renders the Confrontation Clause once again inef-
fectual, given the tiny percentage of criminal cases that go to trial.222  
As the Court noted in Frye, “[I]t is insufficient simply to point to the guar-
antee of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial 
process.”223 To be sure, for cases that actually make it to trial, in-court 
cross-examination of the government’s witnesses would satisfy the 
adversarial testing purpose of the Confrontation Clause. But there is no 
good reason to design a rule that accomplishes its mission in a small 
fraction of the cases and leaves the others untouched. 
A pretrial right of confrontation demands a pretrial procedural 
vehicle. The natural candidate is a deposition.224 At a deposition, lawyers 
                                                                                                                           
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth 
Amendment First Principles, 84 Geo. L.J. 641, 706 (1996) (characterizing cross-examination 
as a right “at the heart of the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses”); Richard D. 
Friedman, Anchors and Flotsam: Is Evidence Law “Adrift”?, 107 Yale L.J. 1921, 1939 (1998) 
(describing cross-examination as a right “underlying the Confrontation Clause”). That’s not 
to say, of course, that cross-examination is the Confrontation Clause’s sole concern. See 
Friedman, Meaning of Testimonial, supra note 63, at 257. 
 222. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 223. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012). 
 224. Another option would be to harness an existing procedural mechanism—the 
preliminary hearing—for the purpose. The way in which preliminary hearings are currently 
structured, however, poses difficulties. For one, preliminary hearings are constitutionally 
required only for charges filed by information, not by grand jury indictment. See 4 LaFave 
et al., supra note 195, § 14.2(d). A bigger problem is prosecutors are not obligated to call 
every witness at a preliminary hearing whose testimonial statements they used to charge, but 
only enough to satisfy a minimal evidentiary threshold. See Abraham S. Goldstein, The State 
and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149, 1183 
(1960). The purpose of a preliminary hearing, moreover, is not to probe the strengths and 
weaknesses of the prosecution’s case. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968). To be 
sure, it would be possible to reengineer the preliminary hearing so that it would provide 
pretrial confrontation. Indeed, something like this has been done in Great Britain in the 
modern era. See William J. Knudsen, Jr., Pretrial Disclosure of Federal Grand Jury 
Testimony, 48 Wash. L. Rev. 423, 429 (1973). Such a reengineered preliminary hearing 
would look a lot like the depositions proposed in this section, but likely with two differences. 
One is that there would be a judge or magistrate present, which would tend to increase the 
cost of pretrial confrontation. The other is that preliminary hearings, unlike depositions, 
are open to the public. This has both costs and benefits. On the one hand, as we will see 
below, there is reason to think that private depositions are less taxing on vulnerable crime 
victims than testifying in open court. See infra note 315 and accompanying text. On the 
other hand, those emphasizing the dignitary interests of the Confrontation Clause may see 
an advantage to face-to-face confrontation between accuser and defendant happening in a 
public forum. On the Confrontation Clause as serving dignitary interests, see Sherman J. 
Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the Confrontation Clause, 81 Neb. L. Rev. 1258, 
1270–71 (2003); Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 Fla. 
L. Rev. 863, 897–917 (1988). 
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examine a witness under oath in the presence of a court reporter. 
Depositions are an essential element of pretrial civil discovery, but they are 
rarely used or even available in criminal cases.225 This Essay’s approach to 
the Confrontation Clause would change that. In an era where plea 
bargaining is the dominant mode of adjudication, the Sixth Amendment 
should guarantee criminal defendants the opportunity to depose the 
government’s charging witnesses. 
How might these “Sixth Amendment depositions” work as a practical 
matter? The first step would be for the prosecutor to identify the 
“witnesses” whose testimonial statements she relied on to charge the 
defendant.226 Some jurisdictions already require prosecutors to do some-
thing like this. In Iowa, for instance, when returning a formal charge, the 
prosecutor must attach a “minutes of evidence” containing “the name and 
occupation of the witness upon whose testimony” the “indictment is 
found” or the “information is based.”227 Jurisdictions without such a mech-
anism would need to develop a procedural vehicle for prosecutors to 
disclose their charging witnesses.228 
After the government named its charging witnesses—and after any 
motions practice about whether those witnesses’ statements qualify as 
testimonial—the defendant would be entitled to take depositions. In civil 
litigation, depositions are of two basic types—perpetuation and discov-
ery.229 Perpetuation depositions are conducted to “perpetuate” testimony 
when a witness is expected to be unavailable at trial.230 Discovery 
depositions, as their name suggests, are tools for discovering new infor-
mation from or about the deponent.231 Functionally, Sixth Amendment 
depositions would work much like discovery depositions. That is, defense 
lawyers would probe the government’s charging witnesses to test their 
testimony. Prosecutors could attend as well to interpose objections and ask 
                                                                                                                           
 225. 5 LaFave et al., supra note 195, § 20.2(e). 
 226. The details of Sixth Amendment deposition procedure would need to be worked 
out over time. This Essay’s goal is simply to provide a procedural sketch sufficient to show 
that Sixth Amendment depositions are practically feasible. 
 227. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.4, 2.5(3). Iowa is one of a handful of states that currently permit 
discovery depositions in criminal cases. These state practices are discussed below. See infra 
note 284 and accompanying text. 
 228. Further discussion of the government’s obligation to disclose witnesses, and how 
to enforce it, appears in section III.B. 
 229. See Jean Montoya, A Theory of Compulsory Process Clause Discovery Rights, 70 
Ind. L.J. 845, 856 (1995) (distinguishing perpetuation and discovery depositions). 
 230. In a pre-Crawford article, John Douglass argued that expanded use of these kinds 
of depositions would advance Confrontation Clause values. See Douglass, Beyond 
Admissibility, supra note 30, at 269–70. 
 231. See generally John G. Douglass, Balancing Hearsay and Criminal Discovery, 68 
Fordham L. Rev. 2097, 2188–89 (2000) [hereinafter Douglass, Balancing Hearsay] 
(describing discovery depositions). 
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questions of their own.232 Prosecutors do not, of course, represent victims 
or other witnesses,233 so jurisdictions would need to decide whether to 
permit the deponent to bring a lawyer.234 Except in cases where the 
deponent had some sort of personal exposure in the matter, though, a 
lawyer for the deponent would, at least ordinarily, probably not be 
necessary. 
Sixth Amendment depositions would differ from discovery depo-
sitions in two key respects. First, only “charging witnesses” would be 
required to sit for depositions. That means that Sixth Amendment 
depositions would not be a tool to discover exculpatory information from 
witnesses overlooked by law enforcement. Further, among people who did 
provide information to law enforcement, only those who made 
“testimonial” statements would be subject to deposition. People who sat  
for ordinary police interrogations could be deposed, as could police 
officers who made oral or written reports to prosecutors, but not 
individuals who spoke to the police with the “primary purpose” of 
handling an ongoing emergency;235 people who made statements in 
informal contexts;236 or (probably) very young children.237 These limit-
ations mean that a Sixth Amendment deposition regime would be more 
limited, and less costly, than a discovery deposition regime. 
Second, Sixth Amendment depositions and discovery depositions 
have different purposes. The ostensible purpose of a discovery deposition 
                                                                                                                           
 232. Because these witnesses would often be aligned with the prosecution (and thus 
amenable to speaking with the prosecutor informally), such cross-examination might be 
rare. That would be consistent with practice in civil litigation, where “counsel [frequently] 
will choose not to cross-examine one of their own witnesses during the witness’s deposition.” 
See 1 Steven G. Gensler & Lumen N. Mulligan, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and 
Commentary Rule 32 cmt. (Feb. 2020 update). 
 233. See Laurie L. Levenson, Post-Conviction Death Penalty Investigations: The Need 
for Independent Investigators, 44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. S225, S241 (2011). 
 234. Permitting the nonparty deponent to bring an attorney would be consistent with 
the “general rule” in civil litigation. Women in City Gov’t United v. City of New York, 112 
F.R.D. 29, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“As a general rule, a person being deposed, whether a party 
or a non-party witness, is entitled to have counsel present at his deposition. This rule is 
intended to allow the deponent to intelligently exercise testimonial privileges—chief among 
them being the privilege against compulsory self incrimination.”). In Florida, one of the few 
states that permits discovery depositions in criminal cases, victim-witnesses are entitled to 
have a victim advocate at their depositions. Fla. Stat. § 960.001(1)(q) (2020). 
 235. See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 349 (2011) (holding that statements by a 
shooting victim were not testimonial); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828–30 (2006) 
(holding that statements of certain 911 callers were not testimonial, depending on whether 
circumstances indicated an ongoing emergency). 
 236. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (“An off-hand, overheard remark 
might be unreliable evidence and thus a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, 
but it bears little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted.”). 
 237. See Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 247–48 (2015) (“Statements by very young 
children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause. Few preschool students 
understand the details of our criminal justice system.”). 
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is to prepare a case for trial.238 As the Supreme Court observed in 1947, 
depositions under the then-new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure play “a 
vital role in the preparation for trial,” helping to ensure that “civil trials in 
the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark.”239 Though 
Sixth Amendment depositions might sometimes be useful to defendants 
as a trial preparation tool, that is incidental to their real function—
providing information useful in plea bargaining. 
The core purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to deploy adversarial 
testing of the government’s case to enhance the fairness and accuracy of 
criminal adjudication.240 That is precisely what Sixth Amendment 
depositions would do. “Accuracy,” in the context of plea bargaining, 
means plea prices that reflect the likely outcomes of trials.241 That means 
“higher prices” (longer sentences) for defendants without viable trial 
defenses and “lower prices” (shorter sentences, noncarceral dispositions, 
and dismissals) for defendants with a realistic prospect of acquittal at trial. 
By closing a crucial information deficit in plea bargaining, Sixth 
Amendment depositions would make it possible for plea prices to more 
accurately track what would happen at a hypothetical trial. 
Witness testimony is the heart of many, if not all, criminal trials.242 As 
an experienced criminal defense lawyer observed in a trade publication, 
“[E]ffective cross-examination that casts doubt on the credibility of a 
witness is what wins cases, period.”243 Yet when lawyers negotiate plea 
bargains, they usually have to speculate about the credibility and 
                                                                                                                           
 238. See James W. McElhaney, Objecting at Depositions, Litigation, Summer 1988, at 
51, 51–52 (“We use depositions for lots of purposes—to investigate the case, learn what the 
witnesses will say, prepare them for trial, evaluate our opponent’s witnesses, give our own 
cases a trial run, keep witnesses from changing their stories, and push our opponents toward 
settlement.”). But see Steven Lubet, Showing Your Hand: A Counter-Intuitive Strategy for 
Deposition Defense, Litigation, Winter 2003, at 38, 67 (“[I]t is simply an empirical error to 
treat deposition defense as though its primary purpose is to prepare for trial. Instead, the 
deposition should be recognized as a critical stage of an ongoing negotiation.”). 
 239. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). 
 240. See supra notes 139, 200–201 and accompanying text. 
 241. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv. L. 
Rev. 2463, 2465 (2004) [hereinafter Bibas, Shadow of Trial] (“[T]he classic shadow-of-trial 
model predicts that the likelihood of conviction at trial and the likely post-trial sentence 
largely determine plea bargains.”). There is now a large literature on the many factors that 
render actual plea outcomes “inaccurate” on this metric. See, e.g., id. at 2465–67 
(describing factors—such as risk preferences, time discounting, agency costs, and poor 
lawyering—that render the shadow-of-trial model overly simplistic); see also William 
Ortman, Probable Cause Revisited, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 511, 555 n.250 (2016) [hereinafter 
Ortman, Probable Cause] (collecting sources). 
 242. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (observing that the “common-
law tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing”). 
 243. Denis M. de Vlaming, Practice Points: Trying a Criminal Case: A Primer, Champion, 
May 2005, at 46, 47. 
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effectiveness of the accusatory witnesses.244 This information deficit 
impairs litigants’ ability to predict their chances of prevailing at trial, which 
in turn distorts plea prices.245 If a defendant doesn’t know that the 
prosecution’s eyewitness is partially blind, they may agree to an unduly 
harsh plea.246 Conversely, if a defendant erroneously believes that the 
government’s star cooperating witness can’t put together two coherent 
sentences, they might refuse a plea deal that would be in their interest to 
accept. 
Now enter Sixth Amendment depositions. Pretrial depositions of the 
government’s charging witnesses would improve the informational 
ecosystem of plea negotiations in two principal ways. First, as the examples 
above suggest, they would be a mechanism for both sides to acquire 
information about the strengths and weaknesses of the government’s case. 
Sometimes (as in the case of the eyewitness revealed to be partially blind) 
the new information would strengthen the defendant’s hand in plea 
negotiations, leading (ceteris paribus) to a lower plea price. In other cases 
(like the supposedly bumbling cooperator revealed to be a polished 
witness), the new information would redound to the prosecution’s benefit, 
leading to a higher plea price.247 
Second, depositions would also have a signaling function. When a 
defendant knows that a prosecution witness has a credibility problem, they 
can use a deposition to signal that the problem exists and that they know 
about it. In some cases, where the revelation is serious, prosecutors might 
decide to dismiss the case.248 More often, the revelation would cut into the 
prosecutor’s leverage, leading to a lower plea price. 
Less intuitively, but perhaps more importantly, Sixth Amendment 
depositions would be an opportunity for defense counsel to credibly signal 
                                                                                                                           
 244. See Russell M. Gold, Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Civilizing 
Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 1607, 1625 (2017) (“The lack of access to evidence 
often inhibits defendants from forming an accurate, independent assessment of their 
likelihood of conviction to inform their bargaining positions.”); see also Bibas, Shadow of 
Trial, supra note 241, at 2495 (“[I]nformation deficits are much greater in plea bargaining 
than in civil settlement negotiations.”). 
 245. On plea bargaining as “pricing,” see generally Russell D. Covey, Plea Bargaining 
and Price Theory, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 920 (2016) (“[E]xamining the impact of the major 
trends in criminal justice through the lens of price theory reveals how the state has managed 
to manipulate the plea bargaining market . . . .”); Anne R. Traum, Fairly Pricing Guilty 
Pleas, 58 How. L.J. 437 (2015) (describing how the imbalance between a defendant and a 
prosecutor’s access to information can result in unfair pricing). 
 246. This example is inspired by one in Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of 
Plea Bargaining, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 1303, 1338 (2018). 
 247. Depending on the thoroughness of the prosecutor’s precharge (or at least 
predeposition) investigation, this information might be new to them too. 
 248. See Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield 
to New Realities, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 541, 613 (“If the state finds that it cannot have confidence 
in its witnesses, for example, the prosecutor may decide to terminate the prosecution, 
amend the charges to more accurately correspond to the evidence, or revise its plea offer.”). 
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to their client that their case would have problems at trial.249 It is one thing 
for a defense lawyer to relay a prosecutor’s insistence that a witness is 
credible. It is a far different thing for a defendant to see the witness’s 
credibility firsthand. Like the information-acquisition function, the signal-
ing function of Sixth Amendment depositions would contribute to more 
realistic assessments of what would happen if cases went to trial and, thus, 
to fairer and more accurate plea prices.250 
I have to acknowledge that there is a degree of irony to this proposal. 
In Crawford, the Court pointed a finger at the English system of Marian 
examinations (sometimes called depositions)251 as the very “abuse[]” that 
the right of confrontation emerged to curtail.252 “[T]rial by deposition,” 
Judge Nancy Gertner has observed, is “precisely what the Confrontation 
Clause was designed to avoid.”253 Yet I am arguing that the Confrontation 
Clause is not only compatible with depositions in criminal cases, but that 
it requires them. How can that be? The surface answer is that it was never 
the taking of depositions, but their use at trial, that brought constitutional 
scorn.254 And even then, the Court in Crawford wasn’t concerned with 
examinations (or depositions) full stop, but just ex parte ones.255 
                                                                                                                           
 249. Cf. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for 
Truth? A Progress Report, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1990) (“Discovery serves other ends as 
well. The most important of these subsidiary purposes, given courts’ crowded criminal 
dockets, is that a guilty defendant is more likely to plea-bargain and plead if the prosecution 
discloses to him a strong government case.”). 
 250. To be sure, there is a range of criminal cases in which even a revealing Sixth 
Amendment deposition might not materially affect the parties’ plea bargaining leverage. 
That’s because menus of overlapping criminal statutes with variable sentencing severity 
sometimes give prosecutors so much leverage that a defendant’s probability of acquittal at 
trial doesn’t figure meaningfully into the price of a plea. See Ortman, Second-Best, supra 
note 77, at 1078–83 (“[W]hen criminal codes are stacked with overlapping offenses, pleas 
are not negotiated ‘in the shadow of the law.’ . . . [F]or many crimes, the details of 
substantive law are unlikely to affect plea outcomes.” (citing William J. Stuntz, Plea 
Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2548, 2250–52 
(2004))). In those cases, even a Sixth Amendment deposition that uncovered a prosecution 
witness’s serious credibility problems might not result in a more favorable plea offer. But 
this dynamic does not apply in all cases. In high-stakes cases—homicides, for example—and 
in cases where the government’s evidence is very weak, prosecutors lack leverage to set plea 
prices unilaterally. Id. at 1081. These are cases in which Sixth Amendment depositions would 
be particularly valuable. 
 251. See Davies, supra note 210, at 580 n.80 (describing and criticizing this 
nomenclature). 
 252. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004) (“Through a series of statutory 
and judicial reforms, English law developed a right of confrontation that limited these 
abuses.”). 
 253. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 38, 41 (D. Mass. 1998); 
see also Stoner v. Sowders, 997 F.2d 209, 213 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[A]llowing trial by deposition 
violates both the literal language and the purpose of the Confrontation Clause . . . .”). 
 254. See supra notes 129–132 and accompanying text. 
 255. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. 
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The surface answer isn’t wrong, but it’s not satisfying. The deeper 
answer is that I am proposing a “second-best” approach to the Confron-
tation Clause.256 A criminal legal system in which the government’s 
evidence is probed via cross-examination at trial may be the ideal (“first-
best”) constitutional ordering. In a world of trials, Sixth Amendment 
depositions would be redundant, and maybe even wasteful. But our 
criminal legal system has very few trials. If the values behind the 
Confrontation Clause matter, it is better to test the government’s evidence 
via depositions than to “adjudicate” cases with no adversarial testing at all. 
In this way, Sixth Amendment depositions are a second-best response to a 
criminal legal system in which trials have vanished.257 
B. Enforcing Sixth Amendment Depositions 
As the previous section explained, the Sixth Amendment deposition 
process would begin with the prosecutor disclosing the names of witnesses 
they relied on to charge the defendant.258 The list would include those 
who provided information directly to the prosecutor, as well as those who 
are “witnesses” by virtue of making a testimonial statement to another 
witness, such as a police officer. The government’s disclosure is necessary 
(defendants cannot depose the government’s charging witnesses unless 
they know who they are), but it introduces complications. One com-
plication is that prosecutors might sometimes have a legitimate need to 
keep a charging witness anonymous at the time they file an information or 
indictment; that complication is addressed in the next section.259 Another 
significant complication—and the one addressed here—is that a 
prosecutor might not be fully forthcoming in their witness disclosure. A 
prosecutor who wanted to avoid a particular deposition might, that is, 
leave a witness off the list.260 So we need an enforcement mechanism. 
An exclusionary rule would be a useful, albeit incomplete, solution. 
Absent special circumstances, prosecutors could be prohibited from 
calling a witness at any proceeding that implicates the merits of the case 
(such as a preliminary hearing or a trial) if the witness was (1) known to 
the government when it filed charges, but (2) not included in its disclosure 
                                                                                                                           
 256. For background on the general theory of second best, see Ortman, Second-Best, 
supra note 77, at 1062–65. For an illuminating discussion of second-best thinking in 
constitutional interpretation, see Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 Ind. 
L.J. 307, 311–12 (2008). 
 257. On the “vanishing” criminal trial, see Ortman, Second-Best, supra note 77, at 
1062–63. 
 258. See supra notes 226–228 and accompanying text. 
 259. See infra section III.C.2. 
 260. The well-known problem of prosecutorial noncompliance with Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83 (1963), suggests that this has to be taken seriously. See Bennett L. Gershman, 
Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 531, 533 
(2007) (“[V]iolations of Brady are the most recurring and pervasive of all constitutional 
procedural violations, with disastrous consequences . . . .”). 
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of charging witnesses.261 The point of such an exclusionary rule is not to 
ensure fair preliminary hearings or trials, though that may be a side 
benefit. Rather, the point is to give prosecutors an incentive to be 
comprehensive in their disclosures, lest an omission leave them without 
their in-court witnesses when they need them.262 
With an exclusionary rule, the government’s disclosure of its charging 
witnesses would no longer present a ripe opportunity for gamesmanship. 
When a prosecutor chooses not to include a witness they relied on to 
charge the defendant, then (again, absent special circumstances) that 
witness would simply be out of the case, permanently. The strength of the 
witness’s inculpatory information would no longer be one of the factors 
that prosecutors and defense lawyers need to take into account when 
evaluating the government’s case.263 It would be as if the government’s 
witness had never made a testimonial accusatory statement at all. 
There would be circumstances where prosecutors knew, at the time 
they charged a defendant, that a witness had made a testimonial statement 
concerning the case but did not know that the statement was inculpatory 
(or where they knew that it was inculpatory but not that it was reliable) 
until later. And sometimes prosecutors would not even learn of a witness’s 
existence until after they had charged the defendant. A question thus 
arises about how to deal with these new or newly relevant witnesses. Should 
the defendant have the opportunity to depose them? There are two 
approaches the law could take on that question, and each has advantages 
and disadvantages. As this Essay is the first to make the case for Sixth 
Amendment depositions, it seems unnecessary to take a firm position on 
this subsidiary question. Instead, I’ll present the options. 
One option—call it the “closed list” approach—is to make Sixth 
Amendment depositions available only for witnesses disclosed when the 
defendant is charged.264 The primary advantage of this approach is its 
administrability. With a closed list, the number of potential depositions 
would be fixed from the inception of the case. If the defendant intended 
to actually conduct depositions (as opposed to trading depositions for 
leniency),265 those depositions could be completed, and their 
                                                                                                                           
 261. In previous work I suggested a similar exclusionary rule to counter a different 
problem in modern criminal procedure—the lack of precharge evidentiary scrutiny. See 
Ortman, Probable Cause, supra note 241, at 567 n.323 (proposing “an exclusionary rule 
providing that, absent special circumstances, at trial the government may only offer 
evidence that it presented to the grand jury or screening magistrate”). 
 262. Cf. Erica Hashimoto, Motivating Constitutional Compliance, 68 Fla. L. Rev. 1001, 
1010 (2016) (observing that “shaping . . . law enforcement incentives” is “the primary 
purpose of the [Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule”). 
 263. See supra notes 242–247 and accompanying text. 
 264. Note, however, that where the government files a superseding indictment or 
information, new charges would require new disclosures. Even on the closed-list approach, 
then, the universe of Sixth Amendment depositions wouldn’t be entirely fixed upon the 
filing of the first charges. 
 265. See infra section III.C.3. 
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informational value incorporated into plea negotiations, by a date 
(relatively) certain. 
The closed list’s chief disadvantage is that it reintroduces the prospect 
of prosecutorial misconduct. Prosecutors wishing to avoid depositions 
might assert disingenuously that they did not rely on a particular witness 
to charge the case, counting on the fact that they could point to some 
intervening development as their reason for “reevaluating” that determi-
nation if the case went to trial. Even more dangerously, prosecutors might 
cut precharging investigations short to intentionally avoid learning about 
witnesses until after charges are filed and the list of deposable witnesses 
closed. Courts would have to develop rules to curtail such abuses. One 
possibility would be a rebuttable presumption that prosecutors relied on 
any witnesses whose inculpatory information they possessed or reasonably 
should have possessed at the time of charging. That would put the burden 
on prosecutors to defend their omissions.266 The trial court would hear the 
prosecutor’s explanation and determine whether the person should have 
been on the list of charging witnesses. If so, the court would enter an order 
excluding the person (or the person’s testimonial hearsay) from any 
subsequent trial or hearing going to the merits. 
The second option—the “open list” approach—would allow the 
prosecutor to amend her disclosure of charging witnesses prior to trial (or 
some date close to trial), with the defendant acquiring the opportunity to 
depose any witness added to the list.267 The theory would be that once the 
government identifies additional witnesses, they become part of the body 
of evidence under which the defendant is charged. The advantages and 
disadvantages of this approach are a mirror image of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the closed list. The major advantage is that it (largely) 
avoids the risk of prosecutorial manipulation. The prosecutor would gain 
no advantage from holding back witnesses at the time of charging, because 
the witnesses would have to be identified (and subjected to deposition) 
later. Its chief disadvantage is that it would be practically unwieldly. The 
deposition “phase” of litigation would have to be reopened every time the 
prosecutor identified an additional witness. Moreover, depositions taken 
as a trial date nears may be more about preparing a case for trial than 
providing information useful for plea bargaining, and thus attenuated 
from the rationale for having Sixth Amendment depositions in the first 
                                                                                                                           
 266. To the extent that the explanation relied on confidential information involving an 
ongoing law enforcement investigation, it might be provided in an “attorney’s eyes only” 
context or even in an ex parte declaration from the prosecutor to the judge. See Ion Meyn, 
The Unbearable Lightness of Criminal Procedure, 42 Am. J. Crim. L. 39, 86 (2014). 
 267. This is how it works in at least some of the states that permit criminal depositions. 
See, e.g., State v. Damme, 522 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (affirming conviction 
notwithstanding late-added witness where the “[d]efendant was given the opportunity to 
depose the witness”). 
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place.268 I leave it to future analysis to decide which set of advantages and 
disadvantages is better. 
C. Objections 
If you are with me so far—that is, if you agree that the right to depose 
the government’s charging witnesses would update the Confrontation 
Clause for the age of plea bargaining—you might still be worried about 
the practicality or desirability of incorporating depositions into criminal 
cases. This section is meant to assuage such concerns. 
While this Essay is the first to locate a right to depositions in criminal 
cases in the Confrontation Clause, others have advocated for criminal 
depositions on policy grounds, and still others have opposed them.269 One 
of the sharpest objections to depositions in criminal cases was published 
by a committee of the ABA in 1970. The committee articulated several 
reasons for its opposition: 
First, there is no inherent limitation of cost on the conduct of 
unnecessary depositions, because in many cases the costs of the 
defense must be borne by the state . . . . [Second,] the imposition 
on civilian witnesses may discourage their coming forward in 
criminal cases. And, finally, underlying the importance of these 
considerations is the belief that depositions in addition to the 
disclosures otherwise required by these standards will not be 
necessary in most criminal cases. Under its responsibilities in 
bringing a criminal case, the prosecution will ordinarily possess 
written statements or transcripts of testimony of potential 
witnesses of such completeness that additional interrogation by 
the defense attorney, prior to trial, will be of only marginal value 
in most cases.270 
The subsections below address the first two of these objections—that 
criminal depositions would be too costly and that they would impede 
                                                                                                                           
 268. See supra notes 240–242 and accompanying text. 
 269. For an overview of the debate, see generally John F. Yetter, Discovery Depositions 
in Florida Criminal Proceedings: Should They Survive?, 16 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 675 (1988). 
Interesting recent calls for criminal depositions (on nonconstitutional, policy grounds) 
include Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in 
Criminal Adjudication, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 1585, 1638–40 (2005) [hereinafter Brown, The 
Decline]; Douglass, Balancing Hearsay, supra note 231, at 2187–92; Prosser, supra note 248, 
at 607–13. 
 270. Standards Relating to Discovery & Proc. Before Trial § 2.5 cmt. at 87 (Am. Bar 
Ass’n, Approved Draft 1970). The quoted text omits one other objection advanced by the 
ABA committee: “[I]f stated as a right, the need to take depositions might be construed as 
part of the adequacy of representation required by the constitutional right to counsel.” Id. 
This objection is quite peculiar. It is true that if criminal defendants have a right to take 
depositions, then competent defense counsel would, under some circumstances, have the 
duty to assist their clients by conducting them. Sixth Amendment depositions would not be 
necessary in every case; sometimes, the best and highest use of the right would be to trade 
it away in plea bargaining. See infra section III.C.3. But yes, of course, it would sometimes 
be a defense attorney’s duty to take depositions. 
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witnesses. A final subsection deals with an objection the committee did not 
raise—that depositions would just become just another bargaining chip 
for prosecutors and defense lawyers to wrangle over. 
Before turning to those serious concerns, however, a word on the ABA 
committee’s remaining critique—that criminal depositions are unneces-
sary because the “written statements” of government witnesses are reliable 
enough. If you read section II.A of this Essay, the ABA’s final objection 
may sound familiar, as it picks up just where the judges who tried Sir Walter 
Raleigh left off.271 It is hard to conjure an outlook more antithetical to the 
values underlying the Confrontation Clause. As the Supreme Court 
observed in Crawford (channeling an important Antifederalist): “[W]ritten 
evidence . . . [is] almost useless; it must be frequently taken ex parte [sic], 
and but very seldom leads to the proper discovery of truth.”272 
1. Resource Considerations. — One persistent objection to depositions 
in criminal cases is that they would be too expensive.273 Opponents point 
out that the state must pay not only for the costs of prosecutors (and often 
public defenders) to attend but also for the time of law enforcement 
officers called to sit for depositions.274 On one level, this objection rings 
true—depositions are not free.275 Of course, that could be said about 
almost any rule or procedure involved in the criminal legal system. 
Requiring police officers to write out affidavits to secure search warrants is 
expensive.276 So is providing lawyers for indigent defendants.277 Trials are 
really expensive,278 as are appeals,279 as are collateral proceedings attacking 
convictions.280 That something isn’t free tells us virtually nothing about 
whether it is worthwhile.281 
                                                                                                                           
 271. See supra notes 156–158, 161 and accompanying text. 
 272. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004) (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richard Henry Lee, Letter IV by the Federal Farmer, 
reprinted in 1 Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 469, 473 (Leon 
Friedman, Karyn Gullen Browne, Joan Tapper, Betsy Nicolaus, Christine Pinches & Jeanne 
Brody eds., 1971) (misquotation)). 
 273. See Douglass, Balancing Hearsay, supra note 231, at 2190 (describing objections to 
discovery depositions); Prosser, supra note 248, at 613 (same). 
 274. See Yetter, supra note 269, at 684. 
 275. See Ortman, Second-Best, supra note 77, at 1101. 
 276. See William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth 
Amendment, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 842, 848 (2001). 
 277. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Gideon’s Paradox, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 955, 960–61 (2004). 
 278. See Bibas, Shadow of Trial, supra note 241, at 2504 n.166 (“Even a slam-dunk trial 
imposes significant costs on the court and lawyers . . . .”); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, 
Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1932 (1992) (“Trials are elaborate and costly 
affairs.”). 
 279. See Peter D. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Appeal, 22 Duke J. 
Compar. & Int’l L. 1, 10 (2011). 
 280. See Ryan W. Scott, In Defense of the Finality of Criminal Sentences on Collateral 
Review, 4 Wake Forest J.L. & Pol’y 179, 185 (2014). 
 281. See Prosser, supra note 248, at 613 (contending that arguments about the costs of 
depositions “ignore the significant truth-seeking value of criminal depositions”). The ideal 
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Perhaps, then, the objection is really that depositions would be 
impractically expensive. If so, the objection has a ready answer. Sixth 
Amendment depositions would, as suggested above, be functionally 
similar to discovery depositions.282 Though most states do not afford 
criminal defendants the opportunity to conduct discovery depositions, a 
handful do, and they seem no worse for the wear.283 The procedural details 
vary, but in at least six states—Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, North 
Dakota, and Vermont—criminal defendants may depose prosecution 
witnesses as a matter of right.284 Some of these states are thinly populated, 
and perhaps their experience is not generalizable.285 Florida is the third 
largest state by population, so it makes sense to focus there.286 
Florida has permitted criminal defendants to take discovery 
depositions as a matter of right for almost half a century.287 At least twice 
in that time, criminal depositions have come under political attack by law 
enforcement interests.288 In 1988, a coalition of Florida’s elected 
prosecutors, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, police 
departments, and organizations representing crime victims attempted to 
have depositions abolished.289 They estimated that depositions cost the 
                                                                                                                           
way to address the question would be through cost-benefit analysis. But analyzing the costs 
and benefits of a procedural mechanism that does not yet exist is probably impossible. My 
aim for this section is more modest—to show that Sixth Amendment depositions are not 
impractical. In other words, I hope to show that courts would not be dooming (or further 
dooming) the criminal legal system if they adopted my proposed approach to confrontation. 
 282. See supra text accompanying notes 231–232. 
 283. See George C. Thomas III, Two Windows into Innocence, 7 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 
575, 592–601 (2010) (examining the frequency and costs associated with discovery 
depositions in various states). 
 284. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(h); Ind. Code § 35-37-4-3 (2020); Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.13; 
Mo. R. Crim. P. 25.12; N.D. R. Crim. P. 15(a)(2); Vt. R. Crim. P. 15; see also Darryl K. Brown, 
Discovery, in 3 Reforming Criminal Justice 147, 156 & n.29 (Erik Luna ed., 2017). In a 
handful of other states, defendants may be allowed deposition based on a showing of good 
cause, or something akin to it. See Prosser, supra note 248, at 609 (“In [some jurisdictions], 
such as Texas, Nebraska, and New Hampshire, the defendant must make a showing of the 
need for the deposition.”); Thomas, supra note 283, at 592–98 (“[S]ix states . . . permit[] 
defendants to depose all prosecution witnesses and five others . . . permit[] discovery upon 
leave of the court.”). 
 285. Thomas, supra note 283, at 592–93 (“A discovery process that might work just fine 
in Vermont could pose an administrative nightmare in a more populous state. Indeed, of 
the six states that permit defendants to depose all prosecution witnesses, four of them are 
primarily rural—Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, and Vermont.”). 
 286. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Florida Passes New York to Become the Nation’s 
Third Most Populous State, Census Bureau Reports (Dec. 23, 2014), https://www.census.gov/ 
newsroom/press-releases/2014/cb14-232.html [https://perma.cc/P3RR-URQL]. In high-
lighting Florida, I am following George Thomas’s lead. See Thomas, supra note 283, at 593. 
 287. Yetter, supra note 269, at 680–81 (explaining the origins of Florida’s discovery 
deposition procedure in 1972). 
 288. On prosecutorial opposition to depositions generally, see Ion Meyn, The Haves of 
Procedure, 60 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1765, 1819 (2019). 
 289. Yetter, supra note 269, at 684. 
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state more than $35 million annually in attorney and police officer time.290 
The legislature directed the state’s supreme court to look into the matter, 
and the court assigned the task to a commission.291 The commission 
reported back that while some tinkering with the procedural details would 
be useful, depositions “make a unique and significant contribution to a 
fair and economically efficient determination of factual issues in the 
criminal process” and “should be retained as part of Florida’s Criminal 
Justice process and . . . not abolished or significantly curtailed.”292 A 
strikingly similar process played out in 1996, when a coalition that included 
the state’s Attorney General, twenty of its elected state’s attorneys, all  
three United States Attorneys, and a host of organizations representing 
police officers and prosecutors again attempted to persuade the legislature 
or the state supreme court to abolish criminal depositions.293 And again, 
while the abolitionists succeeded in getting some minor procedural 
reforms, the system of depositions proved resilient to their attacks.294 
The coalitions seeking to abolish Florida criminal depositions in 1988 
and 1996 were not lacking for political influence. Prosecutors tend to get 
their way on matters of criminal justice policy.295 If they had a good case to 
make that criminal depositions in Florida were impractically expensive, 
one can reasonably expect that they would have made it.296 Yet these 
coalitions failed in their efforts to abolish depositions twice in less than ten 
years. Their failure is circumstantial evidence that criminal depositions are 
not impractical in Florida. That, in turn, is evidence—again circumstantial—
                                                                                                                           
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 675–76. 
 292. Id. at add. at 695 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Crim. Discovery 
Comm’n, Report of the Florida Supreme Court’s Commission on Criminal Discovery 20 
(1989)). 
 293. See Howard Dimmig, Deposition Reform: Is the Cure Worse than the Problem?, 
Fla. Bar J., July–Aug. 1997, at 52, 53–55. 
 294. Id. 
 295. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 715, 727–28 (2005) 
(noting that “one of the most . . . powerful lobbying groups in criminal law consists of those 
exercising the penal power: law enforcement and, in particular, prosecutors”); William J. 
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 534 (2001) 
(explaining that “legislators have good reason to listen when prosecutors urge some 
statutory change” and describing this dynamic as “the single most important feature for 
defining criminal law”). But see Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
171, 207–08 (2019) (noting that “[t]he mechanism by which prosecutorial lobbying 
influences criminal law is unclear” and arguing that “[w]hat commentators think of as 
effective prosecutor lobbying may, in fact, be a shared interest among prosecutors and 
lawmakers”). 
 296. The law enforcement coalition estimated that “in 1987, discovery depositions cost 
police departments statewide 750,000 lost police man hours.” Thomas, supra note 283, at 
594. Noting that there were approximately 350,000 serious crimes in Florida that year, 
George Thomas calculates that this amounts to “about two police hours per case.” Id. 
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that recognizing a Sixth Amendment right to depositions wouldn’t over-
whelm our criminal legal systems.297 If Florida can do it, so can the rest of us. 
2. Confidential Informants and Vulnerable Witnesses. — A more 
substantial policy objection to depositions in criminal cases focuses on 
their effects on witnesses. Witnesses may be “discouraged” (the ABA 
committee’s term) from reporting crimes to police if they know that they 
will have to undergo a deposition.298 Relatedly, defense lawyers might use 
depositions to “harass” witnesses by asking about embarrassing or other-
wise private matters.299 And defendants themselves, armed with knowledge 
of the witnesses against them and their testimony, might—in the words of 
an oft-cited New Jersey Supreme Court decision—“take steps to bribe or 
frighten [witnesses] into giving perjured testimony or into absenting 
themselves so they are unavailable to testify.”300 
As applied to ordinary prosecution witnesses, these concerns look like 
thin pretexts for denying criminal defendants the information-gathering 
tools possessed by civil litigants. In an influential address on criminal dis-
covery generally, Justice William Brennan refuted several of them.301 To 
the possibility that defendants might use discovery tools to harm witnesses 
or bully them into not testifying, Brennan replied that while “there have 
been instances where this has happened,” it could and should be handled 
on a case-by-case basis.302 And as for the “old hobgoblin perjury,” Brennan 
wrote: “I should think . . . that its complete fallacy has been starkly exposed 
through the extensive and analogous experience in civil causes where 
liberal discovery has been allowed and perjury has not been fostered.”303 
Because he did not focus on depositions, Brennan did not have 
reason to consider the possibility that defense lawyers would, by asking 
harassing questions at depositions, discourage witnesses from testifying. 
The line between harassing deposition questions and probative depo-
sition questions, though, depends on one’s vantage point. Imagine that a 
defense lawyer is deposing an eyewitness to a bank robbery who called a 
police tip line promising a $5,000 reward for information leading to an 
arrest. From the witness’s perspective, the lawyer’s questions about their 
                                                                                                                           
 297. Id. at 601 (concluding, based on the experience of Florida and other states that 
have tried criminal depositions, that incorporating depositions into criminal practice is 
“achievable”). 
 298. See Standards Relating to Discovery & Proc. Before Trial, supra note 270, at § 2.5 
cmt. at 87. 
 299. See Yetter, supra note 269, at 685 (describing the argument of deposition 
“abolitionists” in Florida). 
 300. State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (N.J. 1953). 
 301. See Brennan, supra note 249, at 290–94. 
 302. Id. at 292. 
 303. Id. at 291; see also Rand N. White & Tom E. Wilson, Note, The Preliminary Hearing 
in California: Adaptive Procedures in a Plea Bargain System of Criminal Justice, 28 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1207, 1235 (1976) (explaining that the experience of civil depositions “deflates the 
proposition that a correlation exists between expanded use of the deposition and unlawful 
conduct”). 
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child’s medical bills will undoubtedly feel like harassment. From the 
lawyer’s perspective, the questions are essential to determining whether 
the monetary reward biased the accusation. 
Witness-related objections to criminal depositions have more force if 
we focus on two specific types of prosecution witnesses: confidential law 
enforcement witnesses, on the one hand, and crime victims, especially 
vulnerable victims of crimes involving sexual and domestic violence, on 
the other. 
a. Confidential Witnesses. — Prosecutors may object that depositions of 
confidential informants and undercover law enforcement agents would 
risk witness safety.304 This objection is not entirely without merit.305 
Confidential informants and undercover agents whose testimonial hearsay 
prosecutors rely on would be subject to deposition under my proposal. 
Their identity would thus need to be disclosed to defendants at an earlier 
point in the criminal process than it is today. In some cases, the change in 
timing could implicate legitimate law enforcement interests.306 That might 
happen, for instance, when a confidential informant is still conducting 
controlled drug buys on other targets, or where an undercover agent stays 
in the field after charges are filed against some, but not all, members of a 
criminal conspiracy. 
In the unusual case where the timing of the disclosure implicates 
legitimate law enforcement interests, there are a number of things courts 
could do. The simplest option would be to delay depositions until the 
relevant law enforcement activities were complete, but this will not always 
be possible.307 Courts have allowed witnesses to testify anonymously even 
at trials,308 and anonymous depositions—using, for instance, screens and 
voice disguising technology—could be an option in extreme cases. Or the 
witness’s identity might be kept secret from the defendant, but disclosed 
to his lawyer under a protective order. It is even possible that a defendant 
                                                                                                                           
 304. I am grateful to Darryl Brown for suggesting this point. 
 305. Informants who provided background information that does not form part of the 
corpus of the government’s evidence against a defendant would, however, remain out of 
sight. See generally United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (describing 
the “informant’s privilege,” which “allows the Government to refuse to disclose the identity 
of a person who has furnished information about criminal activities”). 
 306. See Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, Colum. L. Rev. 1, 55 (2015) (“[I]nformation 
that enables one defendant to warn his compatriots that they are investigative targets also 
harms society.”); Brown, The Decline, supra note 269, at 1622 (“In some contexts 
[especially federal practice], information disclosure might compromise ongoing 
investigations based on confidential government information, such as informant identities. 
It could also facilitate defendant perjury.”). 
 307. This approach may be problematic where the defendant is detained pending trial, 
as delaying depositions could extend the period of pretrial confinement. 
 308. See United States v. Gutierrez de Lopez, 761 F.3d 1123, 1139–47 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(using a two-prong framework to evaluate whether “anonymous” trial testimony violates the 
Confrontation Clause). 
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could be excluded altogether from a particularly sensitive deposition 
conducted by his lawyer, though this would raise additional difficulties.309 
b. Victims/Vulnerable Witnesses. — The other category of witnesses for 
whom depositions pose special concerns are victims (and potentially other 
witnesses) of violent crime. George Thomas explains the difficulty: 
“Depositions are traumatic experiences for all witnesses and more so for 
victims of crime, particularly violent crime, because they must relive the 
incident and also must face aggressive questioning.”310 There’s no denying 
that recognizing a Sixth Amendment right to depositions in criminal cases 
would impose additional burdens on crime victims, including the victims 
of sexual and domestic violence.311 There are, however, a few reasons why 
those burdens may be less extensive than they first appear. 
First, it is significant that the right to Sixth Amendment depositions 
would extend only to those who have made “testimonial” statements. After 
Ohio v. Clark, that limitation means there would probably not be Sixth 
Amendment depositions of very young children, an important subcategory 
of vulnerable crime victims.312 It also means that there would not be Sixth 
Amendment depositions of victims who provided information to police 
under circumstances where the “primary purpose” of the interrogation 
was to deal with an ongoing emergency.313 As noted earlier, the reach of 
Sixth Amendment depositions would be narrower than the reach of 
ordinary discovery depositions.314 
Second, there is reason to think that deposition testimony is less 
traumatic than trial testimony. In a 2005 article on Crawford’s impact in 
domestic violence cases, Tom Lininger quotes a technical assistance 
packet prepared by Nicole Lindenmyer of the Battered Women’s Legal 
Advocacy Project: “Depositions are usually less stressful” than testifying at 
                                                                                                                           
 309. Excluding the defendant altogether poses a knotty legal question. On one hand, 
personal presence at trial is a core component of the Confrontation Clause. See Illinois v. 
Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970) (“One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the 
Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of 
his trial.”). On the other hand, it isn’t obvious whether adversarial testing at a deposition 
depends on the defendant’s personal presence. I see reasonable arguments on both sides 
and leave the question to future analysis. 
 310. Thomas, supra note 283, at 598. 
 311. See Gold et al., supra note 244, at 1648 (“[Vulnerable] witnesses and victims 
already face the emotional turmoil of having to tell their stories at trial, and allowing them 
to be deposed would force them to experience that trauma twice in the criminal process.”). 
 312. 576 U.S. 237, 247–48 (2015) (“Statements by very young children will rarely, if ever, 
implicate the Confrontation Clause. Few preschool students understand the details of our 
criminal justice system.”). 
 313. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828–30 (2006) (holding that where the “primary 
purpose” of an interrogation “was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency,” the declarant’s statement was nontestimonial). 
 314. See supra notes 235–237 and accompanying text. 
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trial, Lindenmyer noted, “because the victim may have her own attorney 
present, and she can take breaks as often as needed.”315 
Third, so long as Maryland v. Craig remains good law,316 steps could 
be taken to ensure that vulnerable witnesses are not physically in the 
deposition room with defendants.317 In Craig, the Court approved the trial 
testimony of a child-witness using a one-way video system in which the 
defendant could see the witness, but the witness could not see the 
defendant.318 The argument for procedures like the one approved in Craig 
would be even stronger in depositions than in trials, as there is no risk that 
the technique could prejudice the defendant in a jury’s eyes. Upon a “case-
specific” finding of “necessity,”319 Sixth Amendment depositions could 
proceed with the defendant watching by video from a separate location. 
With real-time video, defendants could even suggest lines of questioning 
to counsel electronically or during breaks.320 Depositions taken under 
these circumstances would allow for adversarial testing of the 
government’s case without subjecting vulnerable witnesses to the trauma 
of being in a small room with the defendant. 
To be sure, these are points in mitigation—it remains true that Sixth 
Amendment depositions would impose burdens on crime victims, 
including vulnerable ones. Those costs are the unfortunate byproduct of 
an adversarial system of criminal justice.321 Maybe we would be better off 
with an inquisitorial system where factfinding is left to a neutral arbiter 
                                                                                                                           
 315. Lininger, supra note 79, at 796 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Nicole A.F. Lindenmyer, Washington v. Crawford: Must Crime Victims Testify Against the 
Defendant?, Battered Women’s Legal Advocacy Project Technical Assistance Packet 4 
(2004)); see also Mosteller, Confrontation of Witnesses, supra note 180, at 610 (noting that 
victims may be more willing to testify at “the outset of the prosecution”). 
 316. 497 U.S. 836 (1990). At the moment, Craig is good law. See 6 LaFave et al., supra 
note 195, § 24.2(e) & n.101. It may be hanging on by a thread. See Mary Fan, Adversarial 
Justice’s Casualties: Defending Victim-Witness Protection, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 775, 806 (2014) 
(noting that after Crawford, “the continued viability of Craig . . . is unclear”); Richard D. 
Friedman, The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and Transformed, 2004 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 
439, 454 (“The categorical nature of [Justice Scalia’s] opinion in Crawford squares better 
with his Craig dissent than with Justice O’Connor’s looser majority opinion in Craig.”). 
 317. Of course, if criminal defendants are not entitled to be personally present at 
depositions, see supra note 309, the Craig point is moot. 
 318. Craig, 497 U.S. at 841–42. 
 319. Id. at 855. 
 320. Id. at 840–42 (explaining that the defendant maintained “electronic 
communication with defense counsel” throughout the child-witness’s testimony). 
 321. The Court addressed this issue squarely in Coy v. Iowa: “That face-to-face presence 
may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same token it 
may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult. 
It is a truism that constitutional protections have costs.” 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988). 
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rather than to the clash of dueling advocates.322 Maybe not.323 But for 
better or worse, we have a system that depends on adversarial testing, yet 
does not do adversarial testing. That’s the void that we need Sixth 
Amendment depositions to fill. 
3. Confrontation as Unbundled Bargaining Chip. — Like nearly all 
criminal procedure rights,324 Sixth Amendment depositions would be 
waivable.325 Does that mean that they would inevitably become just one 
more chip for defense lawyers or prosecutors to use in bargaining? Yes, to 
an extent. As Anne Traum observes, “In guilty plea adjudication, 
defendants do not so much exercise constitutional rights as convert them 
to bargaining chips to use in the plea-bargaining process.”326 In some 
situations, defendants might trade their right to conduct depositions for a 
reduced charge or sentence. In others, prosecutors might penalize a 
defendant who insisted on taking depositions by, for instance, adding 
charges onto their case.327 The inevitable emergence of a “market” for 
                                                                                                                           
 322. See Robert P. Mosteller, Failures of the American Adversarial System to Protect the 
Innocent and Conceptual Advantages in the Inquisitorial Design for Investigative Fairness, 
36 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 319, 353 (2011) (“As to whether the adversarial or 
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 323. See Gerald Walpin, America’s Adversarial and Jury Systems: More Likely to Do 
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 324. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200–01 (1995) (“Rather than 
deeming waiver presumptively unavailable absent some sort of express enabling clause, we 
instead have adhered to the opposite presumption.”); see also William J. Stuntz, Waiving 
Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Va. L. Rev. 761, 772 n.28 (1989) (“For reasons that are 
not altogether clear, courts have never seriously considered the possibility of making 
criminal defendants’ rights nonwaivable.”). 
 325. It would be unwise to make Sixth Amendment depositions nonwaivable, as we 
would not want a rule that requires (for instance) a child-sex-abuse defendant to take the 
victim’s deposition. A closer “waivability” question concerns the prosecutor’s disclosure of 
their charging witnesses. See supra notes 226–228 and accompanying text. An argument 
could be made that a defendant cannot “knowingly” waive their right to Sixth Amendment 
depositions until they ascertain (from the prosecutor’s list) who they would have the right 
to depose. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (“A waiver is ordinarily an 
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”). Given the 
strong preference for waivability, see supra note 324, such an argument seems unlikely to 
succeed. A nonwaivable right to the prosecutor’s disclosure of charging witnesses would, 
moreover, complicate the practice of precharge plea bargaining. For a discussion of that 
practice, see Michael M. O’Hear, The End of Bordenkircher: Extending the Logic of Apprendi 
to Plea Bargaining, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 835, 895–97 (2006). 
 326. Anne R. Traum, Using Outcomes to Reframe Guilty Plea Adjudication, 66 Fla. L. 
Rev. 823, 827 (2014); see also Russell D. Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law After Lafler and Frye, 
51 Duq. L. Rev. 595, 619 (2013) [hereinafter Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law] (“In essence, 
virtually anything and everything can be a bargaining chip.”). 
 327. Or these might be the same situations and vary only depending on the viewer’s 
normative priors. In that, they mirror the debate between “trial penalties” and “plea 
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depositions means that not every case would actually see Sixth 
Amendment depositions. It does not, however, mean that incorporating 
depositions into our criminal procedure would be a futile exercise. 
The approach to the Sixth Amendment this Essay proposes would 
“unbundle” the confrontation right from a defendant’s package of trial 
rights.328 Defendants could invoke their right to confrontation without 
simultaneously invoking all the other rights that accompany a trial. 
Unbundled rights are easier (i.e., less costly) for defendants to exercise.329 
That’s significant. For one thing, if defendants can credibly threaten to 
exercise their Sixth Amendment confrontation right, that supplements 
their leverage in plea negotiations. In a world where prosecutors hold 
almost all the negotiating power,330 changing the bargaining dynamic is 
not a bad thing. 
But more importantly, making the right to confrontation less costly to 
exercise means that in many cases, it could be exercised. In today’s criminal 
legal system, prosecutors have enough leverage to dissuade defendants 
from invoking their trial rights in all but the most unusual cases.331 But 
they don’t have enough leverage to systematically dissuade defendants 
from invoking their pretrial constitutional criminal procedure rights. Some 
try. Some prosecutors, that is, condition plea offers on the defendant not 
filing, for instance, a Fourth Amendment motion to suppress.332 That 
practice surely deters some defendants, but motions to suppress under the 
Fourth Amendment remain fairly common in criminal litigation, as do 
motions to suppress under the Fifth Amendment.333 The same would likely 
                                                                                                                           
discounts.” See generally Allison D. Redlich, Miko M. Wilford & Shawn Bushway, 
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(2013). 
 333. See Stephen G. Valdes, Comment, Frequency and Success: An Empirical Study of 
Criminal Law Defenses, Federal Constitutional Evidentiary Claims, and Plea Negotiations, 
153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1709, 1728 (2005) (“[Survey respondents] reported that a suppression 
motion was made in 7.34% of all cases, led to acquittal or dismissal in 11.62% of the cases 
where the motion was made, and resulted in nonprosecution in an additional 0.69% of 
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be true of Sixth Amendment depositions. Prosecutors would have the 
incentive and the leverage to induce defendants to waive Sixth Amend-
ment depositions in some cases, but not in all. In cases where defendants 
perceived their confrontation right to have significant value, they would 
have a meaningful opportunity to exercise it.334 
CONCLUSION 
In his Lafler dissent, Justice Scalia lamented that the Court had 
“open[ed] a whole new field of constitutionalized criminal procedure: 
plea-bargaining law.”335 He predicted that the “‘constitutional’ rules 
governing [defense] counsel’s behavior” announced in Lafler and Frye 
would inevitably “be followed by rules governing the prosecution’s 
behavior in the plea-bargaining process.”336 Indeed, he regarded it as 
“foolish to think” otherwise.337 
Scalia’s nightmare should be our ambition. Yet no robust body of 
constitutional plea bargaining law has materialized. The few times the 
Court has waded into plea bargaining since Lafler and Frye, its 
interventions have been aggressively modest.338 Nine years on, we are still 
                                                                                                                           
cases.”); id. at 1729 (“While the empirical costs of the Miranda rule are hotly debated, this 
survey found that the motions were made in 3.97% of cases and succeeded 9.86% of the 
time.” (footnote omitted)). 
 334. Florida’s experience with criminal depositions may be instructive here. As 
explained above, Florida is among the states that permit defendants to conduct depositions. 
See supra section III.C.1. Leaders of the Florida defense bar report that depositions are, in 
actual practice, routine. Matthew Meyers, President of the Miami Chapter of the Florida 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (FACDL), observes: “[D]epositions are a very 
regular part of my practice and that of a vast majority of my colleagues in Miami, and 
throughout the State.” E-mail from Matthew Meyers, President, Miami FACDL, to author 
(Nov. 2, 2020) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). “We may not take the deposition of 
every witness listed [by the prosecution],” Meyers explains, “but the lead LEO [law 
enforcement officer], complaining witnesses, eyewitness, etc. are usually taken.” Id. 
Michelle Lambo, President of the Hillsborough County FACDL chapter, notes that she 
“usually conduct[s] . . . a minimum of [two] depositions per case” and that “[m]ore 
complicated matters[] will usually require more than [two] witnesses being deposed.” E-
mail from Michelle D. Lambo, President, Hillsborough Cnty. FACDL, to author (Nov. 2, 
2020) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Benjamin Wurtzel, President of the Central 
Florida FACDL chapter, agrees that depositions are an important and routinely-used 
defense tool in Florida criminal cases. Telephone Interview with Benjamin Wurtzel, 
President, Cent. Fla. FACDL (Nov. 6, 2020). Though it is beyond this Essay’s scope to 
empirically assess the incidence of criminal depositions in Florida, these attorneys’ 
observations corroborate that Florida defendants’ opportunity to conduct depositions is 
indeed meaningful. 
 335. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 175 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 336. Id. at 176 (emphasis omitted). 
 337. Id. 
 338. In Lee v. United States, the Court held that a defendant established prejudice to 
support his ineffective assistance of counsel claim when his lawyer told him repeatedly (and 
wrongly) that a guilty plea wouldn’t subject him to deportation. 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1963, 1967 
(2017). Though the defendant had “no real defense” to the charge, and the Court 
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waiting on the Court to take the next step in updating the constitutional 
law of criminal procedure to account for the fact that ours is a post-trial 
world. 
The principal aim of this Essay is to nominate the Confrontation 
Clause as the site of that next step. It’s a credible candidate, considering 
its similarity (and proximity) to the Sixth Amendment’s Counsel Clause. 
And there is a viable path forward. That path begins with recognizing that 
the Confrontation Clause announces a substantive right, not an eviden-
tiary rule, and with discarding the principle that limits the “witnesses 
against” an accused to trial witnesses. Those doctrinal adjustments would 
open the door to Sixth Amendment depositions and, thus, to restoring the 
Confrontation Clause to its purpose of promoting fair and reliable 
adjudication via adversarial testing. 
To be sure, engrafting depositions into our criminal process will not 
solve the deepest ills of American criminal justice. No one thing can. But 
it would make the criminal legal system a notch “less awful.”339 More than 
that, it would be an installment payment on the broader project the Court 
began in Lafler and Frye.340 Many other aspects of our criminal procedure 
might fruitfully be reconsidered and updated in light of plea bargaining, 
                                                                                                                           
recognized that this would ordinarily mean that a plea caused no prejudice, the Court 
stressed the “unusual circumstances” of the case in its ruling. Id. at 1962–67. The next Term, 
in Class v. United States, the Court held that a guilty plea does not, absent an explicit waiver, 
preclude a defendant from filing an appeal to challenge the constitutionality of the offense 
to which he pleaded guilty. 138 S. Ct. 798, 801–02 (2018). The likely consequence of Class 
is that standard plea agreements will include express waivers of this right. For a post-Class 
example, see Plea Agreement at 9, United States v. DeVoe, No. 3:19CR86 (KAD) (D. Conn. 
Apr. 8, 2019) (“[T]he defendant waives his right to challenge his conviction based on . . . a 
claim that the statute(s) to which the defendant is pleading guilty is unconstitutional . . . .”). 
For an interesting argument that Class and Lee are more significant than they first appear, 
see Lucian E. Dervan, Class v. United States: Bargained Justice and a System of Efficiencies, 
2017–2018 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 113, 119–25; see also Julian A. Cook, III, Federal Guilty Pleas: 
Inequities, Indigence, and the Rule 11 Process, 60 B.C. L. Rev. 1073, 1091–99 (2019). 
 339. See Alschuler, Two Small Band-Aids, supra note 103, at 707 (“[T]he time may have 
come for criminal justice scholars to abandon the search for ways to make the criminal justice 
system fair and principled. Their principal mission today should be to make it less awful.”). 
 340. See Simonson, supra note 15, at 2218 (“The Supreme Court’s . . . rulings in Lafler 
v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye provide further support for the extension of the Sixth 
Amendment into routine nontrial proceedings, as the Court indicated its willingness to 
regulate the constitutionality of everyday plea bargaining procedures in light of the rarity of 
trials today.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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from pretrial discovery,341 to the right to compulsory process,342 to the 
standard for initiating charges,343 to bail,344 to the prohibition against 
double jeopardy,345 to name just a few. Updating the Confrontation Clause 












                                                                                                                           
 341. Should defendants be constitutionally entitled to discovery before a guilty plea? 
See, e.g., Cynthia Alkon, The Right to Defense Discovery in Plea Bargaining Fifty Years After 
Brady v. Maryland, 38 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 407, 409 (2014) (“[I]t is time for the 
Court to recognize that effective assistance of counsel in plea bargaining requires that 
defense lawyers have basic information about the case, both to fully advise their clients and 
to effectively negotiate on behalf of their clients.”); Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law, supra note 
326, at 610–18 (“Given the Court’s repeated emphasis on the importance of adequate 
investigation . . . counsel’s duty to make some minimally sufficient investigation prior to 
advising a client to plead guilty is both consistent with the Court’s Sixth Amendment case 
law and logically apparent.”). But see United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628–33 (2002) 
(holding that the government need not disclose impeachment Brady material prior to a 
plea, but leaving open the question as to exculpatory Brady material); Susan R. Klein, 
Monitoring the Plea Process, 51 Duq. L. Rev. 559, 580 n.72 (2013) (“There is currently a 
circuit split on the issue of whether a defendant can waive her right to exculpatory evidence 
of actual innocence.” (citation omitted)). 
 342. Should defendants be constitutionally entitled to subpoena witnesses for 
exculpatory evidence useful to them in plea bargaining? For scholarly efforts to ground a 
right to criminal discovery in the Compulsory Process Clause (albeit not focused on plea 
bargaining), see Montoya, supra note 229, at 873–78; Peter Westen, The Compulsory 
Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 121–31 (1974). 
 343. Does the dominant probable cause standard for criminal charges continue to make 
sense in a system dominated by pleas? I have argued that it does not. See Ortman, Probable 
Cause, supra note 241, at 558–68 (contending that the probable cause charging standard 
“exacerbates plea bargaining’s vices” and should “probably [be] on the chopping block”). 
 344. Does due process preclude the setting of unaffordable bail as leverage to coerce 
guilty pleas? See Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream 
Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 711, 784–87 (2017) 
(exploring this question). Further, in the age of plea bargaining, should the right to counsel 
extend to bail hearings? See Charlie Gerstein, Note, Plea Bargaining and the Right to 
Counsel at Bail Hearings, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 1513, 1516–17 (2013) (arguing that it should). 
 345. In the age of plea bargaining, should jeopardy attach when plea negotiations 
commence? For the current law on when jeopardy attaches in the context of guilty pleas, 
see 6 LaFave et al., supra note 195, § 25.1(d) & nn.63–88. 
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